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Abstract 
The continuous developments in the field of mobile computing have made it possible to use 
mobile devices for healthcare applications. These devices can be used by healthcare 
providers to collect and share patients' medical data. However, with increasing adoption of 
mobile devices that carry confidential data, organizations need to secure the data from 
unauthorized users and mobile device theft. When unencrypted data is transmitted from 
one device to another it faces various security threats from malicious code, unsecure 
networks, unauthorized access, and data theft. The objective of this research is to develop a 
secure data sharing solution customized for healthcare environments, which would allow 
authorized users to securely access and share patients' data over mobile devices. We identify 
the vulnerable locations in mobile communication network that can possibly be exploited by 
unauthorized users or malicious code to access the confidential data, and develop an 
efficient security protocol that provides end to end data protection without compromising 
device's performance. 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed data sharing architecture, a prototype 
customized for Point-of-Care-Testing (POCT) scenarios was built in collaboration with 
Northern Health, Prince George. Simulations were performed to analyze and validate our 
solution against the pre-defined requirement criteria. 
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Chapter 1 
Mobile Healthcare and Security Issues 
This chapter provides an overview of growing mobile device industry, and its applications 
in healthcare. We discuss security issues involved in sharing sensitive data over mobile 
devices, and introduce our proposed work that efficiently overcomes these issues. 
1.1 Introduction 
Mobile devices such as smartphones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), tablets, and laptops 
are available at an affordable cost today. With advancements in technology these devices 
have become computationally powerful and can be used for accessing emails, sharing 
multimedia, browsing the web, and much more. The mobile device industry is growing at a 
rapid rate, and the average time spent by users on mobile applications (mobile apps) has 
surpassed web browsing [1]. Approximately 80 million smartphones were sold just in third 
financial quarter in 2010 [2]. Technology analysis firm Gartner predicts that by year 2013 
there will be 1.82 billion smartphones alone (not including tablets), which will be higher 
than 1.78 billion Personal Computers (PCs) [3]. There are over 4.6 billion subscriptions of 
mobile applications that enable users to accomplish majority of tasks currently done on their 
desktop computers. For example, Salesforce mobile application [4] provides instant access 
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to business and client data, logs sales, accesses charts and graphs directly on the mobile 
device. Square [5] is another popular mobile app that enables any compatible mobile device 
to accept credit card payments using a portable credit card reader. Mobile banking 
applications are available for accessing financial information, transferring funds, and 
making payments. 
Mobile devices have the potential to provide preeminent infrastructure for 
implementing healthcare applications that enable physicians, pharmacists and nurses to 
access patients' health data from any remote location, and share it amongst them. For 
example, a physician could use a smartphone or a tablet to access information about 
patient's health such as lab results or medical history during a home visit, or share this 
information with another physician at a remote location. Future developments would enable 
using mobile devices to be connected to medical devices such as glucose monitors and blood 
pressure monitors. A study from Manhattan Research found that 71% of physicians who 
participated in a study consider smartphones to be essential to their practice and 84% of the 
physicians said that the Internet is critical to their jobs [6], Using mobile devices in 
healthcare increases the accessibility of patient data and greatly improves the accuracy and 
speed with which medical decisions can be made. 
Data sharing over mobile devices offers many potential benefits to the healthcare 
industry. However, there are several issues that must be handled before data sharing 
solutions can be deployed. Mobile devices have small screen size and limited input 
capability, which makes designing an optimal user interface difficult. Mobile computing 
platforms are different than conventional desktop platforms and have limited computational 
and battery resources. It is challenging to design a single application that would be 
compatible with mobile devices using different platforms [7]. Installation of third party 
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applications with unknown security vulnerabilities, or accidental navigation to untrusted 
sites introduce security risks such as downloading of malicious code without the knowledge 
of the user. Furthermore, mobile devices are prone to loss and theft due to their compact and 
portable nature. 
Around the globe, attempts have been made to improve the way in which data can be 
accessed in terms of location, speed, and convenience; although data security on mobile 
devices is still an open challenge [8]. Due to strict privacy laws that protect patient data, it is 
crucial that all pertinent data is secured from theft or exploitation by unauthorized users. To 
fight against spamware, malware or any other malicious code, a solution that currently exists 
is installing an antivirus application on the mobile device that detects and removes the 
infection. Scanning mobile devices for malicious code, or having an antivirus program run 
as a background application can slow down the performance of the device making it 
unusable for other tasks [9] [10] [11]. Simply relying on antivirus software is not enough as 
they provide protection against threats from malicious code, but doesn't protect against theft 
or unauthorized access. Even if the mobile device is stolen, there should be no situation in 
which a patient's data could be compromised. One possible solution to this problem is data 
encryption, but the encrypted data still remains available to the unauthorized person in 
possession of the stolen device. There is always a possibility that a brute force attack may be 
applied and data may be revealed. 
All the existing solutions ensuring data privacy depend on encryption using strong 
cryptographic algorithms that use large sized keys. The problem with such solutions is high 
implementation complexity and computational cost that affects the mobile device's 
performance, making such solutions less desirable. Most solutions encrypt the entire data on 
the device memory, and decrypt it every time data needs to be viewed. In this situation, the 
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time and computation resources required for read/write operation can become excessive. 
Mobile device security is a crucial area of research, but unfortunately, not many solutions 
are available that are affordable, efficient and scalable, and almost none are available which 
could be directly applied to health industry. The aim of this research is to find an efficient 
data sharing solution that is specially customized for health industry, and can be practically 
applied to provide data security without compromising mobile device's performance. 
1.2 Security Issues in Mobile Data Sharing Environment 
The following is a general chain of events that occur when mobile devices exchange data: 
the sender sends the data to the server via a network connection (either wireless or wired). 
The receiver is then notified about new data, at which point the receiver connects to the 
server and retrieves the data. The security threats in sending data from one mobile device to 
another can be classified into three major categories based on the location of attacks [12] 
[13] [14]. 
1. Insecure Networks: Data must be protected during transmission. An attacker may 
eavesdrop on the network connection or tamper with the data, the communication 
channel should therefore be encrypted. It is important to provide typical 
cryptographic security services such as entity authentication, data authentication, and 
data confidentiality [14] . Using standard mechanisms like Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) at the transport layer or IPsec at the Internet 
layer can safeguard the network against such threats [14] [15]. For this research, we 
assume that the communication channel is secure and uses SSL / TLS at the transport 
layer. 
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2. Insecure Servers: "The data server is most susceptible to compromise due to 
mismanagement, improper configuration or worse, a hacker" [13]. There could be 
different types of attacks on the server, like a denial of service attack, malware or 
virus infections, spamware, or even worse a hacker may attack and take over control 
of a server. The hacker can then access and modify critical data. Storing data that is 
encrypted can protect against such attacks. Since servers host large quantities of data, 
encrypting/decrypting the entire collection of data every time an access is required 
can be expensive in terms of computational cost [13]. Optimization techniques must 
be applied to reduce computational cost involved. Finding such optimization 
techniques is an important component of this research. 
3. Insecure Terminals: The mobile device itself is susceptible to various threats for a 
multitude of reasons. These devices resemble PCs in that they utilize complex 
software, which invariably contains bugs and vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities 
have posed serious threats by allowing attackers using Bluetooth to completely take 
over a device [11]. Security experts are finding growing number of viruses, worms 
and Trojan horses that target mobile devices. The attacks are not just theft of user's 
financial information but also include deletion of information, artificial inflation of 
bills and blocking network traffic [16], There have been popular malicious codes 
such as Cabir (a worm that arrives on mobile devices running on Symbian platform 
and uses the Bluetooth connection to replicate itself on other devices), Skull (a 
Trojan horse that disables Bluetooth, Internet, and SMS communication on the 
mobile device), and Mquito (a virus that once installed automatically sends 
international SMS to inflate the monthly bill) [16], Using a firewall, access control, 
or antivirus software protects the mobile device against such threats, but such 
solutions are too demanding in terms of computational and memory resources for 
5 
real-time detection and removal of the threats [17]. Mobile devices usually use 
removal media such as subscriber identification module (SIM) and micro Secure 
Digital (SD) cards that can store data. The combination of the portable device size 
and the additional removable memory capacity, create opportunities for sensitive and 
proprietary data to be removed from a facility and stored in an insecure fashion [18]. 
In addition to the above threats, the loss of encryption keys must also be handled. Assuming 
that organizations use encryption techniques to protect the data on mobile devices and 
servers, it becomes important to secure the encryption keys. If an unauthorized user gains 
access to the keys the data is no longer secure. It is important that the users such as ex-
employees of an organization, who have had access to the critical data in past, should not be 
allowed to access data or the encryption keys. About 60% of the reported attacks have been 
from disgruntled users who are either current employees or former employees [13]. Data 
access privileges of such users must be immediately revoked to disable any further access to 
the data. 
1.3 Proposed Work and Contribution 
We propose the development of a low cost, secure data sharing architecture that meets 
Health Level Seven (HL7) standards [19] for exchanging medical data. The architecture 
would allow healthcare providers to securely access patients' health data using mobile 
devices that are registered with health organizations. It integrates with Electronic Medical 
Record (EMR) applications that are directly connected with existing lab delivery networks 
inside a healthcare system. This integration enables receiving patients' lab results directly on 
the mobile devices. The architecture employs standard security mechanisms such as 
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authentication, authorization, and encryption to protect sensitive data and overcome the 
security issues identified in section 1.2. 
The goal of the research is providing end to end data security, which includes securing the 
data while it is on the server, on the mobile device, and in transit. The solution enhances 
existing security protocols by reducing their current complexity and computation cost. It has 
been designed to meet the following fundamental requirements as defined in [20]: 
1. Unauthorized access to the data must be denied. 
2. Lost data should be recoverable to a new mobile device. 
3. Read / write operations on the data should occur in a reasonable amount of time. 
In addition to the above, our solution accomplishes the following extended requirements: 
4. Only authorized devices must be allowed to access data. 
5. A user must be allowed to register multiple devices, and data should be synchronized 
across all the devices. 
6. Mobile devices should be able to securely interact with the registered EMR 
applications, in order to make its data available wirelessly on the device. 
The main contribution of this research is the data sharing architecture designed specifically 
for healthcare environments. It consolidates data into a single data-store located at the server 
side, and provides security mechanisms that ensure data privacy and integrity. Our data 
sharing architecture outperforms existing data sharing solutions in terms of time taken for 
data read/write operations (see section 4.5). By moving majority of cryptography operations 
on the server instead of the device, we have been able to significantly reduce the 
computational resources required on the mobile device. The solution uses strong encryption 
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and hashing algorithms that have been recognized as standards by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). It integrates with an organization's existing user-
management services such as Active Directory, and doesn't require purchasing additional 
hardware to provide security. Furthermore, the use of open standards such as XML and 
SOAP eliminates language or operating system dependency, and ensures interoperability 
between mobile devices with different platforms. Hence, the deployment cost for our 
solution is lower than existing data sharing solutions which are strictly proprietary in terms 
of supported standards and applications. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
We use Constructive Research Methodology to build our solution. Constructive research is a 
well-established practice in the field of software engineering. It aims at producing novel 
solution to practically and theoretically relevant problems [21]. It involves problem solving 
through the construction of models, diagrams, plans and strategies, with well-defined phases 
of research. The methodology can be summarized as follows: 
1. Identify a practically relevant problem. 
2. Obtain comprehensive understanding of the problem 
3. Construct a solution to the research problem, and build a prototype to demonstrate 
the feasibility of the solution. 
4. Show original research contribution and theoretical relevance 
5. Examine the scope for practical usage of the solution. 
Following this methodology, our approach to design a secure data sharing architecture was 
as follows: 
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1. Identify the challenges in designing and implementing a secure mobile data sharing 
system. 
2. Architect a solution to overcome the challenges 
3. Build a prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of the solution 
4. Run simulations to perform thorough testing; ensuring scalability and security, and 
5. Evaluate the usability of the system through feedback from general physicians 
In order to identify the challenges related to our research, we studied existing literature on 
mobile device security, and data sharing solutions in medical and non-medical areas. 
Through an extensive literature review we found out the strengths and weaknesses of 
different approaches. We then constructed a solution that meets the requirements identified 
from our initial motivation (as discussed in section 1.3) and subsequent literature review. To 
demonstrate the feasibility of the researched solution, a prototype customized for data 
sharing within a health organization was built. The prototype consists of an Apple iOS [22] 
based mobile application that runs on any Apple mobile device (iPhone, iPod or iPad), and 
enables healthcare providers to gather, share, or monitor data related to patients' health. We 
present the literature review in chapter two, our proposed solution in chapter three, and 
prototype implementation in chapter four. Chapter five presents the conclusions of our 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides an overview of various mobile healthcare applications, and existing 
data security solutions in mobile environments. We discuss the salient features of different 
security techniques and existing data sharing solutions. We identify their strengths and 
weaknesses, and summarize the common drawbacks and limitations. 
2.1 Introduction 
Clinical care requires healthcare professionals to be able to access patients' health data in an 
efficient and timely manner. Mobile healthcare has untapped potential and is still in early 
stages of development. Many mobile applications have been developed to aid different 
medical purposes ranging from general purpose applications used for broadcasting health 
tips, to more specialized ones for emergency or ambulatory environments. Some popular 
mobile healthcare applications include: 
• ECG-Notes: An application to assist healthcare providers in interpreting 
Electrocardiographs (ECGs). It is designed to be a reference guide for physicians and 
surgeons, and helps in identifying any abnormalities in patients' ECG by comparing 
the graphs with stored diagnostic criteria. It also provides useful information that 
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outlines critical medications needed in a cardiac emergency along with indications, 
dosage, contraindications, precautions and side effects for major emergency drugs 
[23]. 
HealthReflex: An application that enables users to track their personal and family 
health information by using any iOS or Android based mobile device. Users can 
store clinical reports, immunizations, procedures, test results and manage their 
medication history on the device, and share this information with a physician who 
can then track prescription history or diagnostic reports [24]. 
BodyMedia: An application to help control obesity by using wireless sensors to track 
users' physical activities, calories and sleep patterns. The sensors collect more than 
5000 data readings every minute that can be accessed by an authorized user such as a 
physician or dietician through an online website [25], 
Electronic Point-of-Care (e-POC): A PDA based electronic healthcare system that 
manages patients' information in an ambulatory care environment [8] [26]. "Paper 
based information is available to a clinician at a point-of-care scenario is effectively 
limited to what the clinicians are able to carry" [27], e-POC helps removing this 
limitation by allowing physicians to collect and exchange medical data in real time 
using a PDA with Internet connection. 
mCare: A telephony-based messaging system developed by U.S. army to send 
messages via cell phones to wounded soldiers in the outpatient phase of their 
recovery [28]. Patients with mild traumatic brain injuries are the target population for 
mCare, and receive a minimum of six messages per week about general health tips, 
appointment reminders and general announcements. These messages are 
disseminated from a central website where healthcare provides can enter and control 
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message content. The messages are sent over a secure Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) tunnel and can be accessed by patients by entering a Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) chosen by the user during registration for the service [28]. 
In addition to above mentioned, the following prototypes have been built: 
• Northern Arizona State University developed a mobile app to assist with healthcare 
crisis due to insufficient medical staff, facilities, and funding in tribal areas of 
Arizona State [29]. The application was deployed on a ViewSonic Pocket PC to 
collect data related to patients' diabetes while conducting a home visit. Data gathered 
includes a thorough analysis of the patient's feet in order to uncover potential foot 
wounds. Healthcare providers are able to enter notes, schedule appointments, and 
make referrals all of which is stored as a part of patient's record. The information 
resides in a relational database stored on the mobile device and can be transferred to 
other medical facilities over the Internet. 
• The Automated Remote Triage and Emergency Management Information System 
(ARTEMIS) is an ongoing research which aims at improving the clinical care under 
emergency/disaster situations by providing real-time physiological information of 
injured soldiers to first commanders/responders and command personnel [8] [30]. 
The application monitors patients' data using a mobile device and transmits it to 
remote medical facilities. This allows medical facilities to initialize triage processes 
(process of determining the priority of patients' treatments based on the severity of 
their condition [31]) and efficiently deliver treatment procedures to the medic. The 
primary target population is the 25% of soldiers who die between five minutes to six 
hours of injury due to lack of efficient communication with remote medical facilities 
that causes delays in providing the treatment on time [32]. 
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A common drawback with such applications is lack of measures to protect patients' data 
from theft and unauthorized access. Most of the times patients' data is stored as plain text 
locally on the mobile device, making the data open to many security risks. This discourages 
wide adoption of such applications within health organizations in spite of many potential 
benefits [33]. Mobile healthcare is an emerging area and requires regulatory standards to 
control thousands of available applications. Several obstacles still need to be addressed 
before mobile healthcare can be widely deployed. Based on different types of security 
scenarios discussed in Chapter 1, the work done in mobile security can be classified in two 
categories - securing the data (including when it is on the server and on the device), and 
securing the communication network. Figure 2.1 shows the classification of related work. 
For this research we assume that the communication can be secured by using the standard 
SSL protocol. We explain how SSL protocol protects data during communication in section 
3.2.1. 
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Mobile Security 
Securing Sensitive 
Data 
Related Work 
Out of scope 
Securing data from 
malicious code Securing data privacy 
Securing the data on 
server 
Securing the data on 
mobile device 
Securing the 
Communication Channel 
Figure 2.1 Mobile Security Classification 
2.2 Securing Sensitive Data 
The work done to protect the data while it resides on the mobile device can be classified into 
two categories: 1) Securing data from malicious code. 2) Securing data privacy. 
2.2.1 Securing data from malicious code 
Installing antivirus software on a traditional desktop PC is a common measure to protect 
data from malicious code such as spamware and malware. Such software scans the files 
stored on the device to identify and eliminate any malicious code by examining files for 
known viruses using a virus dictionary, or by identifying suspicious behaviours in programs 
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that may indicate infection [34]. Currently, Mobile antivirus software replicates traditional 
desktop model where detection services are performed on the device [10]. Due to different 
hardware and software characteristics the security mechanisms designed for desktop 
computers are not adequate for mobile devices. Antivirus software is resource intensive and 
is not suitable for mobile devices due to their limited computational resources. Cloud-based 
antivirus solutions can help reduce on-device resource consumption by moving the data (or a 
copy of data), and the virus detection functionality to off-device network service [10]. 
A cloud-based security architecture called Marvin is proposed in [11], where 
detection of attacks is decoupled from mobile device by placing the detection engine on a 
remote server (cloud). A powerful intrusion detection technique called Dynamic Taint 
Analysis is then used to detect different types of exploits (buffer overflows, format string 
attacks, double free, and so on) that change the control flow of the program. A prototype 
application was developed and deployed on HTC Dream / Android G1 phone platform. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the architecture. The architecture has two main components: 
1. A tracer: It resides on the mobile device and intercepts and records all signals, 
system calls, and read-write operations performed on the device's memory. 
2. A replayer: It resides on the server and replays the execution trace sent by the tracer 
to perform a thorough analysis in order to detect any attacks. 
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Fig 2.2 Marvin Architecture [11] 
The tracer continuously monitors for any new activities on the mobile device. As soon as it 
records a new event, it transmits the recorded information (called trace) to the security 
server. The security server maintains a copy of Data stored on the smartphone, and performs 
a dynamic taint analysis to detect intrusions. This is achieved by re-executing the processes 
(as recorded in trace) on a replica of data by using a smartphone emulator. Whenever an 
intrusion is detected the user is informed and, depending on an organization's policy, 
immediate recovery procedures are started. Various options are suggested for recovery 
procedures such as remote locking the mobile device to prevent unauthorized access, or 
remote wiping the data. The strength of Marvin architecture depends on the following three 
main factors: 
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1. Location of the security server: It is assumed that the server will be hosted at a secure 
place. 
2. When to transmit trace data: Determining the frequency of transmitting data to server 
is a crucial task. Transmitting data in real-time may not be necessary and the 
frequency of transmitting data must be optimized to conserve network resources of 
the mobile device. However, it should still be regular so that the delay between 
attack and detection can be minimized. 
3. Informing the user about an attack: The user must be warned when an attack is 
detected, and recovery procedures must start immediately. 
Since the server stores a copy of the data, Marvin provides ability to restore lost data in case 
of device theft or a critical attack by malicious content. 
Another 'in-cloud' security model has been proposed in [10] that aim at reducing the 
device's C.P.U, memory, and power resources consumed by antivirus software. This is 
accomplished by moving the detection service from mobile device to a server. Similar to 
Marvin architecture, this model consists of two primary components: 
1. Host Agent: A lightweight application that runs on mobile device and inspects file 
activity on the system. It acquires files and sends them to the server for analysis. 
2. Network Service: The network service runs at the server. It receives files from the 
host agent and performs file analysis to detect malicious content. 
Access to each file on the mobile device is trapped and diverted to a handling routine that 
generates a unique identifier (UID) (such as hash) for the file. The unique identifier is 
compared against cached UIDs of previously analyzed files [10]. When a UID is not found 
in the cache list, the host agent acquires the corresponding file and sends it to the server. 
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When network service receives the file a thorough file analysis is performed to detect any 
malicious content. The architecture doesn't specify recovery measures in case a threat is 
detected. 
Benefits of cloud-based antivirus solutions 
Such solutions have three prime benefits: 
1. Better detection of malicious content: Since the detection service is hosted on a 
computationally powerful desktop computer instead of the mobile device, several 
detection engines can be used for file analysis enhancing the accuracy of threat 
detection. 
2. Reduces on-device resource consumption: On-device resources can be conserved by 
transferring files to a server for threat detection. 
3. Reduces on-device software complexity: By deploying a relatively simple software-
agent on the mobile device and pushing the complex detection software on the 
server, the complexity of mobile software can be minimized. 
Limitations of cloud-based antivirus solutions 
1. Disconnected operation: The data security in such solutions always relies on a 
network connection. Mobile devices may enter a disconnected state where the mobile 
agents may not be able to effectively utilize the network-based security services. In 
such an event, data can be compromised. 
2. Data Privacy: Such solutions require sensitive data to be sent to the server for 
analysis. It is important that users understand the privacy implications of such 
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solutions and organizations be able to enforce limitations on what data is transmitted 
to the security server. 
Relying on antivirus software for data security is not enough. The virus definitions in 
software's virus-dictionary must be updated in a timely manner. The virus authors are ahead 
of the curve and have started writing "Polymorphic Viruses". Polymorphic viruses in part or 
whole encrypt or modify themselves in order to not match their definitions in a virus 
dictionary [34], Antivirus software is passive in nature as it waits until an attack is detected. 
Delay in attack detection can cause critical security breach as the data might get 
compromised by the time an attack is detected. Antivirus software does not provide 
protection against unauthorized data access. Hence, using antivirus software alone for 
healthcare applications would not provide adequate security measures required to protect 
sensitive data. 
2.2.2 Securing Data Privacy 
Data privacy can be ensured by using appropriate encryption and authentication techniques. 
Authentication and encryption are the fundamental blocks for any security mechanism that 
protects data from unauthorized access and ensures data confidentiality. For this research, 
we need a reliable authentication technique that provides both user and device 
authentication. Encryption can be hardware-based or software-based. In hardware-based 
solutions the encryption/decryption functionality utilizes the device's high-speed physical 
memory, which accelerates the overall speed of encryption/decryption process. It protects 
the data even if the operating system is not active, for example if data is read directly from 
the hardware [35]. Software-based solutions do not facilitate their own dedicated physical 
memory. They use device's C.P.U and main memory through interfaces provided by the 
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underlying operating system. As stated in [35] "The security level of a software-based 
cryptographic module is upper-bounded by the security level of the mechanism that protects 
the secrecy and integrity of the memory space it uses", the operating system usually 
provides protection against any other applications attempting to access the memory at the 
same time. The strength of the memory protection is often dependent on the robustness of 
operating system and its being free from flaws [36], Most cryptographic algorithms require 
intermediate results to be stored on a temporary memory. These results could be closely 
related to the secret keys, and therefore it is essential that the memory space is secure and 
protected from unauthorized access. 
Due to dedicated physical memory, the hardware-based solutions offer higher degree 
of data security and faster performance in comparison to software-based solutions. However, 
such solutions are expensive and proprietary, which bounds users to be dependent on a 
vendor for products and services. This restricts interoperability between different mobile 
devices and restrains users from switching to another vendor without substantial costs [37]. 
Hardware-based solutions have been criticized for poor documentation as the details of 
implementation are not always published by the vendor. This leaves the user unable to fully 
evaluate the security of the product and potential attack methods [35]. Software-based 
solutions are easy to implement and do not require purchasing special hardware to perform 
cryptographic operations. Most application development languages offer standard 
cryptography libraries which make software-based solutions easier to develop and maintain. 
A software-based encryption solution can be used for multiple applications and purposes 
including message encryption and digital signatures. For this research, we use software-
based cryptography solution due to its low deployment cost, high usability and 
interoperability between mobile devices with different platforms. We assume that the 
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underlying operating system of the mobile device is robust and secures the shared memory 
used for performing cryptographic operations. Table 2.1 summarizes the comparison 
between software and hardware encryption. 
Software-based Encryption 
Hardware-based 
Encryption 
Performance Slow Fast 
Management support for 
the solutions 
Easy to manage 
Poor: lack of built-in 
management software 
Application(s) 
Message encryption 
Digital Signatures 
Encrypt files and folders 
Encrypt a disk or partition 
Encrypt a disk or partition 
Encrypt files and folders 
Implementation Cost Low High 
Platform Independence High 
Low; mostly tied up to a 
specific vendor. 
Table 2.1 Software versus Hardware based Encryption [42] 
2.2.2.1 Mobile Data Sharing Solutions 
In this section we present some mobile data sharing solutions that are directly related to this 
research. 
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Transient Authentication 
Transient Authentication [38] [39] provides user-authentication by using a hardware 'token' 
(key-fob), such as IBM Linux watch, that must be carried by the user all the time. For 
authentication, user provides a password to the token, which wirelessly interacts with mobile 
device on behalf of the user and provides the decryption key. The data on the mobile device 
remains decrypted and cannot be accessed without token's interaction with the device. At 
first, user unlocks the token by providing a pin/password, and binds the token and the 
laptop. This prevents token to accept unknown key-requests from other mobile devices. 
After a mutual authentication between the token and the laptop over a wireless link, a 
session key is exchanged and the session is established for a specified time. Since the 
decryption keys are automatically provided by the token, user does not have to directly 
interact with the mobile device while accessing data. The cached data objects on the token 
are encrypted while the token is out of range from the laptop. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
process of decrypting file contents. 
Key-Encrypting 
Key 
Key-Encrypting 
Key 
File Key 
Session 
Encryption Token Laptop 
File 
File Key 
File Key 
File Key 
Key-Encrypting 
Key 
Fig 2.3 Transient Authentication [39] 
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Transient Authentication scheme is designed to work with laptop computers with high 
degree of computing power. Users potentially have multiple mobile devices which would 
require carrying multiple tokens, which is inconvenient. Encrypted data always remains on 
the device, and in the case of theft or loss an attacker can remove and inspect hard drive 
contents with another machine [39]. If a user loses both the token and the device, the data 
can be compromised. Currently, organizations are unable to audit data breaches from this 
event due to lack of data access tracking. 
Secure Data Sharing Architecture in Mobile Environments 
An approach for secure data sharing among members of a particular group is proposed in 
[20]. The architecture is designed to meet two key requirements: 
1. In case of loss or theft of mobile device, non-group members should not be able to 
access data. 
2. In case of loss or theft of mobile device, the original data must be recovered on a 
new device. 
The following technologies are used to meet these requirements: 
1. Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM): A cryptographic mechanism based on 
public key cryptosystems, used to securely exchange keys among two entities. It 
takes a public key as input and generates an encryption key for data. 
2. Threshold Cryptography: It is a technique in which the private key is distributed 
among N number of members. When receiver needs to decrypt the data using the 
private key, each member computes a partial result by using their share of the 
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private key. All the members send their respective partial results to the receiver, who 
combines the results into the original message. 
At first a Key Distribution Center (KDC) generates public-private key pairs using Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman (RSA) algorithm [40] for the group members among whom the data 
has to be shared. The group's private key is divided into two shares (parts). The first share is 
sent to the server where the data is stored, and the second share is divided iurther into N+1 
sub-shares where N is the number of group members. The sub-shares are distributed to each 
of the members and the server. Since the private key is reconstructed by obtaining more than 
two sub-shares, it remains protected even if some of the group's mobile devices are stolen or 
server's share of the key is revealed. 
When data needs to be shared, a group member generates an encryption key using 
KEM. KEM takes group's public key as input and generates a key which is used to encrypt 
the data. The encrypted-key, which is generated by KEM, and the encrypted data, is sent to 
the server. When a group member needs to access data, a request is sent to the server for 
encrypted data and the encrypted-key. The server generates a partial-encrypted key by using 
server's share of the group's private key, and the encrypted-key. The partial-encrypted key, 
encrypted-data and the encrypted-key, is sent back to the member in reply to the data-access 
request. Subsequently, the member decrypts the encryption key by using member's share of 
group's private key and the information from the server. The data is decrypted with 
encryption key. Figure 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 illustrates the data read and write process. Table 2.2 
summarizes various notations used in figure 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. 
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(Ral). user authentication 
(Ra3). CQ , C/, EK M(M) 
(Ra7). SK M J  
MT 
(Ra2). generate C }  from Co, sk2 ,  $k/  
(Ra8). delete C(H CH M. EKM(M) 
(Ra4). compute KM  with Co, Ci, sk/ 
(Ra5). decrypt EKM(M) with KM 
(Ra6). compute SKMJ with MS^ KM 
Figure 2.4.1 Read Process [20] 
(W1). user authentication 
(W5). Co. w EK„m 
ACK 
(W6). delete KS{, SK M j .  C,. M. EK M{Af)  
(W2). generate C„. KM from pkG 
(W3). encrypt M with KM(EKM(W)) 
(W4). compute SKU, with MS,, KSI 
Figure 2.4.2 Write Process [20] 
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Symbol Description 
MT Mobile Terminal 
C0>C, Encrypted Key 
Km Encryption Key 
M Data that needs to be shared 
Pkg Group's public key 
Table 2.2 Notations used in figure 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 [20] 
Advantages 
1. Protection against lost or theft of mobile device: since the data is encrypted and 
resides only at the server, even if the device is lost or stolen data remains secure. 
2. Group data sharing: the data can be securely shared within a group. This is an 
important feature in healthcare applications as patient's data might need to be shared 
with other healthcare providers for consultation purposes. 
Limitations 
1. Poor data read-write performance: Multiple encryption-decryption operations are 
performed when data needs to be accessed. In a group of two members, the write 
process takes 2.4 seconds and the read process is 3.1 seconds (for the first read). The 
time increases noticeably with larger data size [20], In the healthcare scenario, with 
hundreds of messages sent in parallel, current times would further increase causing 
poor data read-write performance. Currently, the mobile device needs to perform 
multiple encryption-decryption operations for writing or reading data. An alternate 
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solution that reduces the number of times these processes on the mobile device can 
greatly help improving the current results. For example, sending the data as plain text 
over an encrypted SSL channel would provide equivalent security with faster 
performance. 
2. Scalability and Key Management: To protect data against lost or theft of mobile 
device, the group's private key is divided into two parts, one of which is further 
divided into N+l shares where N is the number of group members. In addition, every 
group member generates an encryption key that is used for encrypting the data. Each 
mobile device must store at least two different keys and request for more keys from 
other group members to access data. In case one of the members loses the mobile 
device, all keys must be regenerated and redistributed to all group members. 
Managing so many different keys could be a challenging task, especially in a large 
group where there may be hundreds to thousands of members. If a user is associated 
with more than one group then it will further increase the overhead. 
3. Data visibility among all group members: Shared data is visible to all participating 
group members. If the data needs to be shared only among few specific members of 
the group, a new group with different group keys must be formed. In healthcare 
organizations patients' data may need to be shared between few specific members 
only. Patient data is sensitive in nature; it should not be visible to unintended 
members. 
Concord: A Secure Mobile Data Authorization Framework for Regulatory Compliance 
Another security solution called Concord ensures data privacy by involving the 
organization, that owns the data, in data access process [13]. Data access requires 
organization's permission, and consent from an authorized user. This is implemented by 
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using 2-out-of-2 threshold cryptographic technique that requires at least two entities to 
approve data access. Mediated RSA (mRSA) cryptographic protocol is used to monitor user 
activities. It uses a public key cryptography where a public key is associated with two 
private keys. The Security Mediator (SEM) and the client get a private key each. The key to 
decrypt the data is constructed by using private keys of both SEM and the client. Hence, 
client cannot decrypt data without interacting with SEM, or vice-versa. 
Concord has five main components - Trust Key Server, Connected Enforcer (C-
Enforcer), Disconnected Enforcer (D-Enforcer), Data Server (DS), and the Mobile Device. 
Trust Key Server generates keys for other components and the data-units. The data is 
partitioned into various blocks referred to as data units; each unit is encrypted using data-
unit keys. When data needs to be decrypted, C- Enforcer (available over wired or wireless 
networks) provides data-unit keys to the mobile device. D-Enforcer caches a part of the data 
unit keys and has the same functionality as C-enforcer; it is used only if C-enforcer is 
unavailable. The mobile device stores the encrypted data and a part of encryption/decryption 
key. A copy of data and a decryption-key is stored as encrypted at the server. 
When data needs to be accessed on the mobile device, a request for decryption key is 
sent to C-enforcer, who decrypts the decryption-key and sends it back to the mobile device 
for decrypting the 'data unit key' already stored on the device. The data-unit key can now be 
used to access the data. If in case, C-Enforcer is not available then D-enforcer is used for 
acquiring decryption keys. D-enforcer is another mobile device such as cell phone or a PDA 
owned by the user. 
Advantages 
Since a user must interact with the security mediator (controlled by the organization) for 
data access, organizations can monitor and control access rights on the data. In the event of 
loss or theft of a mobile device, further requests for data accesses to previously-unread data 
on the mobile device can be discontinued. The organization can track down detailed 
information about the data that has been exposed enabling them to initiate steps for 
regulatory compliance [13]. 
Limitations 
Concord requires every user to have at least two mobile devices in order to access data, as 
authors believe that the chances of losing both of the devices at the same time are minimal. 
However, if both the devices are lost or stolen the data is no longer secure. The encrypted 
data always remains on the device and can be brute forced in the event of loss or theft of 
device. Concord focuses on securing data for a single user only and doesn't supports data 
sharing amongst a group, which is unlikely in healthcare as patients' information may need 
to be shared with other healthcare providers. The computation cost and system resources 
required for encryption/decryption in this approach is excessive, and authors have 
acknowledged this limitation as well [13]. A laptop computer was used as mobile device for 
testing Concord's prototype. The performance results provided in [13] will degrade further if 
a less powerful device such as Apple iPhone, iPad or Android-based tablet is used. 
A quick enhancement to Concord's framework could be using alternate threshold 
cryptographic solutions that would be able to reduce number of operations performed to 
read-write data. Alternate cryptographic solution could be using elliptic curve cryptography 
for encryption/decryption instead of RSA. ECC is suitable for resource constrained devices 
29 
because of smaller key size compared to traditional schemes using RSA to provide 
equivalent security. A 163-bit ECC provides a level of security equivalent to that provided 
by a 1024-bit RSA key [41]. 
2.3 Common Drawbacks of Existing Security Solutions 
1. High deployment cost: Most solutions require buying special hardware, key-fobs, 
certificates, or even an additional mobile device that can store encryption/decryption 
keys and authentication information. Such solutions can be very expensive and 
impractical to deploy. 
2. High complexity and computational cost: All solutions perform 
encryption/decryption/hashing multiple times, on the device and the server, in order 
to access the data. This requires dedicated system resources, and introduces 
additional overhead. 
3. Difficult to integrate with existing applications: Potentially, health organizations 
need data sharing solution that can be embedded with their existing EMR 
applications and lab delivery networks. The data sharing solutions discussed in this 
chapter fail to provide support for this integration. Furthermore, it is essential that 
any security mechanism can be integrated with an organization's existing security 
measures. For example, most organizations use a user-management service, such as 
Active Directory, to strictly control authorizations and data access permissions. It is 
required that the new data sharing solution should provide support for such services. 
4. Scalability: Most solutions depend on certificates for authentication, and require 
mobile devices and the server to store multiple cryptography keys. For example, data 
sharing solution discussed in (20) depends on threshold cryptography that requires 
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every mobile device to store at least two keys. In order to decrypt the data, a user 
must contact all other group members who are equally involved in decryption 
process, and send back the partial results to the user. A major drawback of such 
approaches is challenging key management. If any of the group members loses the 
device, all the keys for entire group must be regenerated. If a group member is not 
available or reachable over the network, user would not be able to decrypt the data. 
Similarly, other solutions such as Concord require mobile device to store multiple 
keys, and use them to request an additional decryption key from the server. 
Managing group members, participating devices, and the keys in such scenarios 
becomes challenging as the group size increases. 
5. Data access cannot be controlled in offline (disconnected) mode: With the current 
solutions, unauthorized access to data stored on the device cannot be monitored or 
controlled without the network connectivity. While the device is operating in 
disconnected mode, the organizations would not be able to perform any preventive 
measures such as restricting the data access, or remotely deleting data on the device. 
6. Entire data is encrypted: Most solutions keep the entire data and even 
cryptography keys as encrypted. This requires more computational and memory 
resources and increases the data read-write times. The data must be categorized 
based on sensitivity and encrypted only if required. This could reduce computational 
resources required, as not everything needs to be encrypted. 
The National Encryption Survey held in 2006 found three most significant reasons given by 
the security and privacy professionals for not encrypting sensitive and confidential data to be 
as follows [42] [43]: 
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1. System Performance: Sixty nine percent of the participants believed using 
encryption would somehow affect the system performance. 
2. Complexity: Forty four percent of the participants felt encryption techniques are too 
complex. 
3. Cost: Twenty five percent of the participants did not support encryption because of 
additional costs involved in implementing encryption based solutions. 
Hence, we conclude that all the existing security solutions are either too complex or 
expensive to provide adequate security measures, or they are not secure enough. Therefore, 
the problem of secure data sharing is still an open challenge. We propose a new data sharing 
solution in chapter 3, which overcomes many limitations exhibited by the existing solutions 
and efficiently secures the data. 
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Chapter 3 
Secure Data Sharing Architecture 
(SDSA) 
In this chapter, we present our solution to the research problem described in chapter 1. We 
first discuss important terminology and underlying algorithms that make the foundation for 
our work, and later we describe our solution in detail. 
3.1 Definitions of Key Terms 
This section outlines the important terminology used in subsequent sections of the chapter. 
Authentication: It is a technique where one party proves its identity to another party. It is 
the fundamental block in every security mechanism that helps in distinguishing legit user 
from an invader. Authentication can be performed at two levels - message authentication 
and entity authentication. Message authentication aims at identifying the origin of message, 
whereas, entity authentication aims at identifying the entity itself. An entity can be a person, 
a client, or a server. The party who needs to prove its identity is called claimant, and the 
party that is trying to confirm the identity of the other party is called verifier [15]. 
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Data Confidentiality: It refers to concealing data in a way that prevents disclosure of 
information. It is designed to protect data against two types of attacks - snooping and traffic 
analysis. Snooping refers to an attack under which the invader eavesdrops on the 
transmission network to intercept data and reveal its contents. A common measure to 
prevent snooping is encrypting data so that it is unintelligible even when it is intercepted by 
an attacker. However, the attacker may still intercept encrypted data and perform analysis to 
guess the nature of data by collecting information such as sender's or receiver's address, 
time of transmission, number of requests and responses. This is referred to as Traffic 
Analysis [44]. 
Data Integrity: It refers to allowing modification of data by authorized entities and through 
authorized mechanisms only. The data integrity can be threatened by several kinds of attacks 
such as modification, replaying, and repudiation [44], Modification includes an attacker 
eavesdropping on the transmission link to capture data packets, and modifying its contents 
before it is received by the recipient. For example, an eavesdropper can capture a message 
from Alex to his bank requesting transfer of $100 into Bob's account. The eavesdropper 
may then modify the message and request transferring of $200 into Bob's account instead. 
Replaying attack involves intercepting messages during transmission, and resending them to 
the receiver. For example, an attacker may resend an intercept message requesting a money 
transfer of $100. Repudiation refers to a situation where the sender or receiver decline to 
accept that the message was sent by them. For example, the sender may refuse that he ever 
requested money transfer. 
Encryption and Decryption: It is a technique for converting plain text into cipher text, a 
form that is unreadable or unintelligible to unauthorized entities. It is achieved by using an 
encryption algorithm such as RSA [40], and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [45] that 
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uses mathematical calculations and algorithmic schemes to perform the transformation. 
Encryption requires secret key(s) as input to these algorithms. The secret key(s) are known 
by sender and receiver, and only they can convert back cipher text into original plain text. 
Decryption is a technique for converting cipher-text into plain text [15]. 
Digital Signature: It is an electronic signature used by sender to sign the data. It is used to 
verify the identity of the sender and data integrity. Depending on the underlying algorithm 
used, the sender creates a signature on the data by using his/her private key. The signature 
and the data are sent to the receiver, who uses sender's public key to recreate the signature. 
Sender's identity can be verified by matching the two signatures [15]. 
Hashing: It is a mathematical concept to generate a fixed short length output by applying a 
hash function that performs various transformations on data. The output of this function is 
called message digest. It is generated in a way that given just the message digest, it is 
impossible to regenerate the original data. Hashing is commonly used in calculating digital 
signatures to provide data integrity [15]. 
Man-in-the-middle attack: It is an attack under which the invader eavesdrops on the 
private network link between the sender and the receiver to intercept messages exchanged 
between them. The attacker can reveal the contents of intercepted messages, and perform a 
replay attack by sending a same message again, or inject modified messages during the 
communication with receiver. Common defense against such an attack involves using data 
encryption and digital signatures that ensures message confidentiality and integrity. 
35 
3.2 Underlying Protocols and Definitions 
We use SSL protocol to ensure secure encrypted communication of data over unsecure 
networks. Hashed Message Authentication (HMAC) is used for device authentication 
purposes. We describe both of these concepts in this section. These concepts have been 
summarized from [15] [46]. 
3.2.1 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
SSL is a standard protocol developed by Netscape to provide security and compression 
services to data during transmission over networks. It ensures data confidentiality and data 
integrity by signing and encrypting the data received from the application layer. It uses a 
reliable transport layer protocol such as Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) [47], and four 
security protocols to accomplish a secure data transmission. The four protocols, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, include Handshake, ChangeCipherSpec, Alert, and Record protocol. SSL 
requires six cryptographic secrets/keys and two initialization vectors to establish a secure 
session between client and server, and exchange data. 
Application Layer 
SSL 
Transport Layer 
Alert Protocol Change CipherSpec Protocol Handshake Protocol 
Record Protocol 
Figure 3.1 SSL Protocol Stack [15] 
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SSL clearly differentiates a session from a connection. "A session is an association between 
the client and a server", once the session is established the two entities (client and server) 
have common information such as a session identifier, the cipher-suit1, and a master secret 
that is used to create keys for message authentication and encryption. To be able to 
exchange data two entities need to create a connection between them. In a session, one of 
the entities is treated as client and the other as server, whereas both the entities are treated 
equal (peers) in a connection. A session can consist of many connections, but a connection 
always belongs to a single session. A connection may be terminated and reestablished within 
the same session. When a connection is terminated, the session can also be terminated but it 
is not mandatory. A session can be suspended and resumed again. When an old session is 
resumed by creating a new connection, the two entities can skip a part of negotiation 
process. The master keys need not to be created every time a session is resumed. The 
separation of session from connection prevents the high cost of creating a master key every 
time a session is resumed. 
In order to exchange data between two entities, a session needs to be established. 
This is accomplished by following a SSL Handshake protocol. During the handshake, both 
entities negotiate on the SSL version and various compression/encryption methods to be 
used. By the end of initial handshake both entities are authenticated and have shared a pre-
master secret. Both entities compute a master key and other cryptographic parameters by 
using the pre-master secret. The ChangeCipherSpec protocol is used to notify that the 
entities are ready to exchange data. Once the entities are in ready state, the SSL Record 
protocol accepts data from the upper layer protocols and fragments it into small blocks of 214 
bytes or less. Each fragment of data is compressed using one of the lossless methods 
1 Cipher-suit represents the key exchange, hashing, and encryption algorithms that are being used for SSL 
session. 
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negotiated between the entities during initial handshake. Finally, each data block is 
individually signed, encrypted, and transmitted over network. 
3.2.1.1 SSL Handshake Protocol 
The objective of Handshake protocol is to negotiate the cipher-suite, authenticate client with 
server and server with client, and exchange other information necessary for building 
cryptographic secrets. Handshake is done in four phases, as shown in Figure 3.1.1. 
n; 
a 
Client Server 
Phase Establishing Security Capabilities 
Server Authentication and Key Exchange 
Phase 3 Client Authentication and Key Exchange 
Finalizing the Handshake Protocol 
Phase 2 
Phase 4 
Figure 3.1.1 SSL Handshake Protocol [15] 
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Phase 1: Establishing Security Capabilities 
During this phase, the client and the server publish their security capabilities and negotiate 
SSL version; algorithms for key exchange, compression, message authentication, and 
encryption. Finally a random number is selected by client and server each. This is used for 
creating a master secret. Figure 3.1.2 illustrates the steps of phase 1. 
Client Server 
Client Hello 
Version 
Client random Number 
Session ID 
Cipher suite 
Compression methods 
Server Hello 
Version 
Server random Number 
Session ID 
Selected Cipher suite 
Selected Compression method 
Figure 3.1.2 Establishing Security Capabilities [15] 
Phase 2: Server Authentication and Key Exchange 
The goal of phase 2 is server authentication. By the end of phase 2, the server is 
authenticated to the client and the client knows the public key of the server. The server sends 
list of certificates for authentication and sends its public key using the key exchange 
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algorithm negotiated during phase 1. The server may request client to authenticate itself by 
sending a message to the client requesting for its certificate. Figure 3.1.3 illustrates the steps 
of phase 2. 
Client Server 
Certificate 
Ser\>erKey Exchange 
Certificate request 
ServerHello Done 
No Contents 
Server Public Key 
A chain of certificates 
List of acceptable certificates 
List of acceptable authorities 
Figure 3.1.3 Server Authentication and Key Exchange [15] 
Phase 3: Client Authentication and Key Exchange 
This phase is similar to phase 2, it is designed to authenticate the client to the server and 
exchange a pre-master secret. Figure 3.1.4 illustrates the details of phase 3. 
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Client Server 
Certificate 
ClientKey Exchange 
Certificate Verify 
Hash code to prove certificate 
Chain of certificates 
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Figure 3.1.4 Client Authentication and Key Exchange [15] 
Phase 4: Finalizing the Handshake Protocol 
In phase 4, the client and the server change their cipher-spec from pending state to active 
state by using ChangeCipherSpec protocol. The client and server send a finish message to 
each other notifying their ready state. Both the client and the server are now ready for 
exchanging data. Figure 3.1.5 shows the messages exchanged during phase 4. 
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Figure 3.1.5 Finalizing the Handshake Protocol [15] 
3.2.1.2 ChangeCipherSpec Protocol 
When the client and the server are ready to exchange data, they need to notify each other 
about the same. SSL mandates that the two entities cannot use their cryptographic 
parameters until they receive a special message, the ChangeCipherSpec message. The 
message is exchanged during the Handshake protocol, and defined in the ChangeCipherSpec 
protocol. To keep track of parameters and secrets, the client and the server both have two 
states - active state and pending state. The active state represents that the sender/receiver is 
ready and has all the cryptographic parameters necessary to exchange data. The 
sender/receiver is in pending state if it is still waiting to create cryptographic parameters. In 
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addition, every state can have two sets of values - read (for inbound messages) and write 
(for outbound messages). When client needs to send the data, it moves the write (outbound) 
parameters from pending to active state, and informs the server about the same by sending 
the ChangeCipherSpec message. When the server receives the message from the client, it 
moves its read (inbound) parameters to active state, and sends the message back to the 
client. The client and server are now ready to exchange data, and can use their cryptographic 
parameters to sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt the data. 
3.2.1.3 Alert Protocol 
Alert protocol is simply used to send error notifications and report any abnormal conditions. 
It has only one message type called Alert-Message that describes the problem and its level 
[15]. Some of the problems that can be notified include no-certificate, unsupported 
certificate, illegal parameter, handshake failure, and decompression failure. 
3.2.1.4 Record Protocol 
SSL uses Record protocol to sign and encrypt messages. Record protocol accepts the data 
from application layer and other upper layer protocols. At the sender's end, the data is 
fragmented into small blocks of 214 bytes with last block possibly smaller than this size. 
These blocks are optionally compressed, and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is 
computed and padded on every message block by using the negotiated hash algorithm (MD5 
[48] or SHA-1 [49]). The compressed message block and the MAC are encrypted using the 
negotiated encryption algorithm. Finally, the encrypted message is sent to the receiver over 
network using a reliable transport layer protocol such as TCP. 
At the receiver end, the received message is decrypted and a MAC is re-computed on 
the message. Message integrity is verified by comparing re-computed MAC with the MAC 
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received in the message. On verifying all the received messages, the fragments are combined 
together to make a replica of the original message. Figure 3.1.6 shows steps performed by 
record protocol. 
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Figure 3.1.6 SSL Record Protocol [15] 
3.2.2 Hashed-Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
MAC is the output of a hash function applied on messages to ensure data integrity and data 
origin authentication. To provide data origin authentication, MAC includes a secret, such as 
a secret key, which is known to the sender and the receiver only. The sender concatenates 
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the secret key with the message and computes a MAC using any hash function such as MD5 
or SHA-1. The sender sends the message and the MAC to the receiver. At the receiving end, 
a new MAC is created on the message and is compared with the one received. If the two 
MACs match, the message is authentic and has not been modified by an adversary [15]. 
Figure 3.2 shows the process of creating and sending MAC. 
Key 
Message M A (  
MAC 
Hash 
Message 
Client 
Network Channel 
Accept 
Server 
Figure 3.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC) [15] 
A major issue with simple MAC is its inability to defend against man-in-the middle attack. 
Suppose an attacker intercepts the message and the MAC, an exhaustive search could be 
performed by appending all possible keys with the message to replicate the intercepted 
MAC. If the MAC is successfully replicated, the secret key would be revealed and any 
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future messages can be compromised. To prevent such situations, nested MACs were 
designed in which hashing is performed in two steps to increase the complexity of 
computing hash, and therefore increasing the cost and effort to replicate the MAC. At first, 
the secret key is concatenated with the message to create an intermediate message digest. 
Secondly, the key is concatenated with the intermediate message digest to create final digest 
[15]. 
For this research we use a standard nested MAC algorithm, called Keyed-Hash 
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), as issued by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) for authentication and verifying data integrity [50]. As recommended by 
NIST, we use HMAC-SHA-256 variant that uses SHA-1 hashing algorithm with fixed 256-
bit key length, which is equal to the output-length2. Key length is a crucial element in 
determining security strength of any cryptography algorithm. With HMAC-SHA-256, using 
a key length that is smaller than the output length can decrease security strength of the 
algorithm. However, due to the unique design of the algorithm key length larger than the 
output length does not significantly increases security strength [51]. The HMAC 
implementation is much more complex than simplified MAC as it includes operations such 
as padding and truncation to enhance security. Figure 3.2.1 shows implementation details of 
HMAC algorithm. 
2 Output-length refers to the size of the hash value produced by the underlying hashing algorithm [51]. 
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Figure 3.2.1 HMAC Implementation [15] 
To generate HMAC every message is divided into n blocks of b bits each. If any block is 
less than b bits in length, it is padded with O's to create b bits. The secret key is left padded 
if it is less than b bits in length. An exclusive-or (xor) function is applied on the secret key 
and a constant called input pad (ipad), to create a b-bit block. The result of the xor operation 
is prepended to the N-block message, and the concatenated message is hashed to create an 
intermediate message-digest. The intermediate message digest, also called intermediate 
HMAC, is left padded with O's to make a b-bit block. An xor operation is applied on this b-
bit block and a constant called output pad (opad). The result of the xor operation is hashed 
again to create the final n-bit HMAC [15]. 
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3.3 Secure Data Sharing Architecture: SDSA 
For this research, we have designed and developed a low cost data sharing architecture, 
called Secure Data Sharing Architecture (SDSA), which enables healthcare providers to 
securely collect, access and share patients' data using mobile devices. In order to facilitate 
data exchange, SDSA integrates with physicians' mobile devices, medical office Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) systems, and existing lab delivery networks. Healthcare providers 
greatly benefit from this integration as it allows them to carry patients' health information 
on their mobile devices while they are out for field visits. The increase in data availability 
assists them in making effective decisions related to patients' treatment and improving 
overall patient care. Using SDSA, healthcare providers can securely share patients' medical 
information over mobile devices with other physicians for consultation. They can even 
request to receive, on their mobile devices, patients' lab results and other critical data such 
as medical history, prescriptions, and payment information that is stored on the EMR 
systems at their clinic. 
In order to protect data from various security threats as discussed in chapter 1, we 
have designed a custom security protocol that secures communications between different 
components of our architecture, and protects confidential data while it is being accessed on 
the mobile device. The protocol is designed to meet health industry specifications (see 
section 3.3.2) for exchanging medical information, and makes use of strong encryption and 
hashing algorithms as recommended by National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). SDSA is platform independent allowing it to be deployed on mobile devices from 
different vendors and operating platforms. It supports both proprietary and open-source 
technologies, such as database management systems and server operating systems, which 
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not only increases interoperability between different systems but also helps in reducing the 
overall deployment cost of our solution. SDSA is scalable in nature and can be used for 
organizations of all sizes. It has the ability to integrate with more than one organization or 
clinic at the same time. 
3.3.1 Architecture Components 
The SDSA architecture consists of five prime components - Client application, Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) application, Web Application Programming Interface (API), EMR 
Data Transfer Agent, and the Data Store. Figure 3.3 illustrates the architecture. 
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1. Client Application 
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4. EMR Data Transfer Agent / HL7 Broker 
2. EMR Application 
Figure 3.3 Secure Data Sharing Architecture (SDSA) 
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3.3.1.1 Client Application 
The client application is installed on mobile devices, and communicates with the Web API 
in order to securely access Data stored at the server. When the client application is launched 
on mobile device, the user is requested for credentials to perform authentication. These 
credentials are transmitted to the Web API over wired or wireless network encrypted by 
SSL, which ensures privacy and integrity of data while in transit. Once the user has been 
authenticated by the Web API, data access permissions are granted for a fixed time interval. 
Instead of using native mobile web-browser to access data, we make use of the client 
application to display the results of various requests (sent to the API) to the user. This 
ensures that the security of our architecture is not compromised due to bugs and issues that 
might exist in the device's native web-browsers. The client application is responsible to 
perform the following tasks: 
• Secure data transmission between the client device and the Web API 
• Secure access to local and server-side data 
• Sending/receiving of messages related to patients' health, labs and results 
3.3.1.2 EMR Application 
The EMR application is used by physicians to collect and store patients' medical data in a 
digital format. It is typically installed at hospitals and physicians' clinics, and may contain 
complete medical information of patients including their demographics, medical history, 
diagnosis, treatments, lab results and payment information. EMRs have been revolutionizing 
health industry for over ten years by eliminating the limitations of paper based medical 
records which require massive storage space, contain redundant data, and inconvenience of 
physically carrying and securing paper records. Computerizing medical records improves 
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overall efficiency in terms of storage and tracking medical history. SDSA extends the 
functionality of EMR application by making patient data, stored inside the application, 
available over mobile devices in a secure way. In order to facilitate this extension, we use an 
EMR data transfer agent that is responsible for extracting data from the application's 
database, and loading it into our Data Store located at the server side. 
3.3.1.3 Web API 
Web API is the backbone of our architecture. It has been built to facilitate the secure 
exchange of patient data among client applications and EMR systems. It is an interface that 
integrates with all other components of our architecture to enable secure sending, receiving 
and storing of data. It acts like a security gatekeeper that is situated behind a secure firewall 
at the server side, and allows only authorized users and mobile devices to access data, by 
performing various authentication checks (see section 3.4). It stores the 
encryption/decryption keys, and is responsible for encrypting data before it is stored inside 
the Data Store, and decrypting it when access is requested. If the client application needs to 
access data, a request is sent to the API which communicates with the Data Store, decrypts 
the data, and sends it to the client over an SSL connection. The API has the following 
functionality: 
• Send/receive patients' data from client applications, and EMR Systems. 
• Encrypt and store received data into the Data Store 
• Decrypt the Data stored in Data Store and send it to client applications 
• Authenticate users using Active Directory 
• Authenticate devices using API keys 
• Provide access control on the data 
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3.3.1.4 EMR Data Transfer Agent 
The EMR Data Transfer Agent uses SSL to facilitate a secure connection, between an 
existing EMR system and the Web API. This connection enables extracting Data stored at 
the EMR system and submitting it to the Web API. For data exchange between the EMR 
system and the Data Store, the agent converts data into XML formatted using Health Level 
Seven (HL7) specifications. The agent runs as a background system service at the server 
side, situated behind a secure firewall, and periodically pulls data from the target EMR in 
order to keep Data Store updated. 
3.3.1.5 Data Store 
Over years, security experts have made their best efforts to consolidate data in a central 
repository as it is more effective and efficient to protect Data stored at a single location 
versus it being spread out. It is like securing the money deposited in banks by placing it 
inside a single locker and applying security measures on the locker. If the money is spread-
out over different locations within a bank, every location would need its own security 
mechanisms. This not only increases the overall cost of security solution but also increases 
risk of theft, as there is more than one location from where the money can be stolen. With 
mobile devices being rapidly used to download and access confidential data, the data is 
scattered again. This increases data theft vulnerability as it is challenging to apply security 
measures on mobile devices and control data usage. Most security solutions discussed in 
chapter two have one fundamental problem in their approach. They all assume that the data 
would be secure if it is stored as encrypted on the mobile device. Storing encrypted data 
ensures data-confidentiality; however, if the mobile device is stolen or lost the encrypted 
data still remains visible to any unauthorized user that possesses the device. 
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SDSA consolidates all sensitive data into a single Data Store located at the server side. 
Since server has high degree of computational power we can easily apply strong security 
measures to protect the data without compromising the overall performance of the system. 
This also mitigates the risk of losing data from the mobile devices, and allows organizations 
to maintain a log of various data access activities on the Data Store. The data is temporarily 
stored on the mobile device for a short duration, while it is being viewed by the user, and 
must be secured on the device. We explain how data is secured while stored inside the data-
store, and while it is on the mobile device in section 3.4. 
3.3.2 Healthcare Industry Data Exchange Standards and Specifications 
The organization and delivery of healthcare services is an information-intensive effort. In 
order to exchange data electronically in healthcare environments, it is essential to use 
standard data formats that ensure interoperability between different computer applications 
within an organization. For this research we use HL7 standard version 2.3.1, as used by 
Northern Health, for data exchange between various components of SDSA. HL7 is an 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) accredited standard that is compatible with a 
large variety of programming languages and operating systems. It supports communications 
in a wide variety of communications environments, ranging from a full, OSI-compliant, 
7-level network "stack" to less complete environments including primitive point-to-point 
RS-232C interconnections and transfer of data by batch media such as floppy disk and tape 
[52]. 
HL7 standard specifies the organization structure for XML messages, and enforces 
messages to use specific data types and field lengths. Every HL7 message has a message 
header segment that specifies the encoding character used. HL7 specifies few required 
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fields, such as Message Header Segment (MSH), Patient Identification (PID), and 
Observation Segment (OBX), that must be filled before a message can be exchanged. This 
ensures maximum interoperability when exchanging data among mobile devices and EMR 
applications. A sample HL7 message is shown in Appendix 1. 
3.4 Securing Sensitive Data 
SDSA provides full security for sensitive data, during transmission, while it is on the mobile 
device, and while it resides on the server. We make use of data encryption and combination 
of different authentication techniques to safeguard the sensitive data. Instead of storing data 
on the mobile devices, the data of every user is stored as encrypted in a consolidated data-
store at the server side. The data is made available to its owner (user) as a service. In order 
to access data, the user must send a request to the Web API asking for data-access 
permissions. The request contains the details about what data needs to be accessed, and the 
credentials of the user for authentication. Once the user's identity is verified the requested 
data is decrypted by Web API and sent back to the client/user over SSL connection. The 
data is always formatted according to HL7 specifications for data exchange. Figure 3.4 
illustrates the process of data access using SDSA. 
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Figure 3.4 Accessing Data using SDSA 
3.4.1 Authentication 
In order to facilitate authentication, we have designed a two-step authentication process that 
performs device authentication at step one, and user authentication at second. User 
authentication ensures that only authorized users can access data, whereas device 
authentication ensures that only registered mobile devices are being used. Users must 
register their mobile device with the server in order to access data. Device registration is 
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only a one time requirement, once the device is registered users are allowed to access data 
by simply using their authentication credentials. Registering devices with the server, allows 
organizations to control data access and revoke permissions in case the device is lost or 
stolen. 
In theory there are many ways to authenticate the user. To be authenticated the 
claimant (user) must identify himselfTherself to the verifier (server) by using one of the 
following witnesses: 
• Something known: A secret that is known only by the claimant, like a password, 
pin or a secret key etc. 
• Something possessed: Something that user may have such as a token or a smart 
card. 
• Something inherent: An inherent characteristic of the claimant such as, finger 
print, voice, retinal pattern, or any facial characteristics. 
For our research, we use username-password (something known) based authentication 
technique due to its simplicity and convenience for users to remember a small paraphrase 
instead of a large size encryption key. Username-password based authentication allows 
integration with services like Active Directory that makes users-management easy and 
enables creating user-groups and hierarchies to enforce different data access permissions for 
different types of users [53] [54]. 
3.4.1.1 Device and User Registration 
For user registration a new Active Directory account is created on the server where user 
selects a unique usemame and password. We assume that the organizations use Active 
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Directory to register users, and users are pre-verified by the organizations through their 
internal policies and procedures before signing up for our service. This allows organizations 
to have complete control on who is permitted to access data. Based on type of data-access 
permissions needed by the user, he/she is added to a particular domain group such as 
physicians, pharmacists, nurses, or administrators. Every user-group has its own unique set 
of permissions. Different types of permissions include read-only, write-only, and read-write 
data access. Categorizing users into different user-groups allows data abstraction which is 
important as not everyone should be able to see patients' data in its entirety. For example, a 
physician should be allowed to see complete medical history of patients, whereas, a 
pharmacist should just see patients' prescriptions. 
Every user must do one-time registration for all their mobile devices that would be 
used for accessing data. In order to register devices, the server generates a cryptographically 
secure 224-bit long random number for every device [44] [55]. This random number is 
appended with a four digit number chosen by the user. This string, 256-bit in total, is used as 
a secret key that is known only to the user. We call this secret key as API key. Next, the 
server generates a hash on the API key by using HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. The output of 
this step is a 256-bit long HMAC which is used to verify device authenticity. The server 
stores the HMAC only. The API key is given to the user and is permanently deleted from the 
server. Hence even if the server is compromised, the user keys are not revealed. The user 
permanently stores a part of the API key, the 224 bits or 28 bytes out of the entire length, on 
the mobile device, and remembers the rest 32bits or 4 bytes. Figure 3.4.1 shows device 
registration process at the server. 
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3.4.1.2 Establishing a Session 
To access data on server, user needs to establish a session with the server. The user and the 
server undergo a handshake initiated by the user in order to establish the session. During the 
handshake, server verifies device's and user's authenticity, and determines type of data-
access permissions. The user sends his/her credentials (username and password) along with 
the device's API key to the server over network using SSL connection. Device's API Key is 
constructed by combining the partial key stored on the mobile device, with the four digits 
entered by the user. On receiving this information, the server extracts the API key from the 
received message and generates an HMAC by using HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm, for device 
authentication. The new HMAC is compared with the HMAC that was stored on the server 
during device registration. If the two HMACs match, the device is authentic. Next, user's 
username and password are extracted from the message and are verified against Active 
Directory. Appropriate data-access permissions are given once the user and the device have 
been authenticated. Figure 3.4.2 shows steps of this handshake between the client and the 
server. 
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Figure 3.4.2 Establishing a Session between the Client and the Server 
All the data exchanged between the server and the user is wrapped in an XML 
message. XML messages are portable and platform independent which allows using separate 
programing technology on the server and mobile device. 
3.4.1.3 Accessing Data on the Server 
Once the session has been established between the client and the server, user is allowed to 
access data until the session is terminated. Currently, data can be accessed only in 
'connected mode'. Every user has a data storage space on the server; we call this storage 
space as user's mailbox. User can view data that resides in his/her mailbox only. Once 
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authenticated, user gets full access to the mailbox and can read or write new data. The 
mailbox can be accessed over multiple mobile devices that are registered by the user. 
Currently, SDSA does not support concurrent sessions between different devices and single 
mailbox. There can be only single active session between the client application and the 
mailbox. Unlike most commercial data sharing solutions such as Blackberry Enterprise 
Server (BES), Dropbox, and Apple's iCloud, which downloads a copy of data on the mobile 
device every time access is required, our solution instead allows client application to directly 
modify the data on Data Store itself by using various Web API calls. Since, there could be 
only one active session the data remains consistent and synchronized between all the mobile 
devices registered by the user. Figure 3.4.3 shows process of accessing and modifying data 
on the server. 
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Figure 3.4.3 Data Modification Using SDSA 
3.4.1.4 Exchanging Data with Other Users 
A user can either create and send a new message, or forward an existing message to other 
users. When the message needs to be sent, a request is sent to the Web API indicating the 
recipient and the data that has to be sent. The server acts like a postman who takes the data 
from user's mailbox and keeps it in the mailbox of the recipient. In order to view received 
data, the recipient needs to establish a session with the server. The data can be shared among 
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registered users only. Figure 3.4.4 shows the process of sending a new message to other 
registered users. Figure 3.4.5 shows how an existing data/message can be shared among 
other users. 
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Figure 3.4.4 Sending a New Message 
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3.4.1.5 Terminating the Session 
After accessing the data, the user must terminate the session. This prevents unauthorized 
personnel from accessing data while the user is away. The session can be terminated by 
simply sending a termination-message to the server. In addition to manual termination of the 
session, we recommend that organizations should enforce time-out policies which would 
automatically terminate the session after a certain time-period. This protects from any 
security breach in case the user forgets to terminate the session while away from the mobile 
device. By default we set the time-out to be two minutes, that is, the user is automatically 
logged-out of the service after two minutes of idle status. We also recommend organizations 
to enforce authentication time-outs to prevent brute-force attacks. A user should only be 
given certain number of attempts to prove identity. If a user fails to identify, he/she must be 
locked out and must contact the system administrator. 
63 
3.4.2 Data Encryption 
The data stored in Data Store is always encrypted. The Web API encrypts data using a 
private-key encryption algorithm, AES [56], AES was chosen as a standard encryption 
algorithm by NIST in year 1991. It is a block cipher that uses 128-bit block size and up to 
256-bit key size. The API encrypts the data before storing it inside the Data Store, and 
decrypts it when data access is requested. Instead of encrypting/decrypting the entire 
database, SDSA individually encrypts all messages. Hence, only the requested message 
needs to be decrypted instead of the entire database. This improves the overall data 
read/write performance. The encryption/decryption key is stored at the server, and is 
accessible only by the Web API. Encrypting data inside Data Store protects data privacy 
from any attacks on the server, and prevents employees at server side without proper 
authorization to access sensitive data. 
3.5 Contribution and Comparison of SDSA 
The main contribution of our work is a low-cost, secure data sharing architecture that is 
customized especially for healthcare organizations. It enables safe exchanging of medical 
data over unsecure wired or wireless networks using mobile devices. The architecture can be 
integrated with any EMR application inside a healthcare system and provide extensions that 
facilitate data sharing over mobile devices. Unlike other data sharing solutions, our 
architecture makes use of HL7 specifications for data exchange ensuring maximum 
interoperability between EMR systems and mobile devices from different vendors. Our 
solution provides end to end data protection, including the time when data is on mobile 
devices, without any significant performance overhead. By moving most of the 
cryptographic computations on the server side instead of mobile devices, we have been able 
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to achieve significant improvement in time taken to send and receive data, versus other 
approaches where computations are mostly done on the mobile device. We present these 
results in next chapter. 
The security protocol provides authentication for both - device and user, ensuring 
that data is accessed by authorized personal over an authorized device only. We use 
username-password based user authentication, and a custom authentication technique for 
mobile devices, in which every device is issued a cryptographically random API key. Since 
the API key is divided into two parts, with one part stored on the mobile device and other to 
be remembered by the user, we are able to protect the API key even when the mobile device 
is stolen. This solves one of the main problems with using certificates based device 
authentication. The certificates stored on the mobile device can be stolen and forged to be 
used with another unauthorized device. With our protocol, even if a part of key is stolen 
somehow, the information is useless without the second part of the key (a four digit number) 
that is known only to the authorized owner of the mobile device. By allowing only the Web 
API to access the Data Store with encrypted data, we ensure that sensitive data is not visible 
to unauthorized employees. Furthermore, our architecture is an open system which supports 
integration with various open source and proprietary technologies, unlike other commercial 
data security solution such as Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES) which is strictly 
proprietary and closed in terms of supported applications. Our architecture provides data 
security without requiring data to be transmitted to a third party Network Operation Center 
(NOC), which raises many privacy concerns such as data being visible by employees at 
NOC, and discourages many enterprises from using such solutions. Table 3.1 summarizes 
some important differences between our work and other existing data sharing solutions 
discussed in section 2.3.2. 
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SDSA 
Other Medical Data Sharing 
Architectures 
Perform Device Authentication Yes 
No, only Transient Authentication 
performs device authentication. 
Perform User Authentication Yes Yes 
Integration with EMR 
applications and Lab Delivery 
Networks 
Yes No 
Resources Required to Protect 
Data at Server 
Low High 
Resource Requirements to 
Protect Data on Mobile Device 
Low High 
Overall Complexity and 
Computational Cost 
Low High 
Scalability High Low 
Store Encryption/Decryption 
Keys on device 
No, only a part of 
API key is stored. 
Yes 
Perform Resource Intensive 
Computations on Device 
No Yes 
Require Additional 
Hardware/Software for data 
Security 
No 
Yes. Transient authentication 
requires key-fobs. Concord requires 
an additional mobile device to store 
keys. 
Deployment Cost Low 
High, due to additional 
hardware/software required. 
Table 3.1 Differences between SDSA and Other Data Sharing Architectures 
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3.5.1 SDSA versus Blackberry Enterprise Server 
The Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES) is a commercial solution designed to extend an 
organization's communication methods to Blackberry mobile devices. It consists of various 
products and components that allow accessing confidential data such as mails, tasks, and 
calendars, over any Blackberry device that is registered with the organization. BES uses 
symmetric key cryptography to encrypt data during transmission over network, and while 
the data is stored on the device itself. It uses username-password based authentication, smart 
card based authentication, or combination of both to provide user authentication. Some 
important distinguishing features between our solution and BES are as follows: 
1. Difference in techniques used for device authentication: By default, BES 
secures data by using user authentication only. Although, it offers an additional 
policy that enforces devices to authenticate itself before any data can be 
accessed. In order to perform device authentication BES uses a unique alpha­
numeric PIN, which is assigned to all Blackberry devices by default for 
identification purposes. BES maintains a list of devices that are allowed to access 
data. The list is stored on the server located inside the organization. On every 
data access request, BES checks if the device's PIN is on the list of authorized 
devices. If the device is not on the list, data access is denied. There are two main 
problems with such an authentication technique. Firstly, the PIN is always stored 
on the device, and it can be revealed if the device is lost or stolen. An attacker 
may even forge an unauthorized device's PIN to be the same as the one stolen 
from an authorized device. This could be a critical security breach that could 
potentially allow an unauthorized device to be able to access organization's 
confidential data. Since the unauthorized device is not tied up to follow any 
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security policies which were enforced on the authorized device, BES might not 
even be able to revoke permissions, or delete data that has been already 
downloaded on such a device. Secondly, if an invader attacks the server, and is 
able to retrieve the list of authorized devices, same security breach would be 
introduced. Currently, the solution to prevent such an attack is by encrypting the 
list on the server. However, the PIN is still visible on the mobile device, and the 
first problem still applies. 
In our architecture, devices are authenticated using cryptographically random 
API key that is used as device identifier. We compute a hash on this key using 
HMAC-SHA-256, and store the hash on server for device authentication. Even if 
the list consisting of device's hash is somehow revealed to an attacker, the 
original API key can still not be reproduced due to the irreversible nature of 
hashing algorithm used. Furthermore, we only store a part of the API key on the 
device which is useless without combining it with the other part, that is, the four 
digit passcode remembered by the user. Hence, even if the part stored on the 
device is stolen or revealed, our architecture still prevents security risks 
associated with BES' device authentication. 
2. BES forwards data to RIM's Network Operation Center (NOC): In order to 
exchange data within an organization, BES connects with organization's 
messaging server, its application server(s), and Research in Motion's NOC. To 
ensure that only legit data-access requests are received by BES, it accepts 
incoming transactions from only one place - NOC. When data needs to be sent 
from a Blackberry device to the server, it is passed to NOC which forwards it to 
the organization's server. This means RIM tracks all the transactions between the 
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device and the BES, which could discourage organizations dealing with highly 
confidential data from using this service. SDSA uses SSL to provide the same 
functionality, without sending data to any third party server that is not controlled 
by the organization. During the SSL Handshake protocol, the device and the 
server exchange important information for authentication. SSL uses a reliable 
transport layer protocol such as TCP to ensure that messages are being sent to 
intended recipient from a legit sender. 
3. BES is strictly platform dependent: BES requires specific hardware and 
software configurations before it can be deployed. Minimum hardware 
requirements of BES are high computing multicore CPUs such as Intel Xeon 
processors, and at least three gigabytes of RAM. For an optimized performance, 
it is suggested that BES should be deployed on Windows server operating system 
only. These specific requirements, along with an expensive licensing fee to use 
BES, make it a very expensive solution especially for smaller organizations. BES 
works with Blackberry devices only, which means, organizations have to restrict 
its users to use these devices only. 
4. BES supports limited applications and lacks support for connectivity with 
EMR applications: The types of data that can be accessed by using services 
provided by BES includes emails, calendars, tasks, notes, and files & documents. 
Basically, BES makes desktop applications such as Microsoft Outlook, or Lotus 
Notes available over Blackberry devices. In order to connect with the existing 
EMRs, any system must support standards specific to health industry, such as 
HL7 for exchanging medical data. Currently, BES doesn't use any such 
specifications for data sharing, and hence fails to directly integrate with the EMR 
applications. Since SDSA is customized specifically to healthcare industry, we 
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ensure all healthcare standards are followed, ensuring smooth integration with 
the existing EMR applications. 
5. BES stores data and encryption keys on the device: BES allows storing 
encrypted data on the device. It uses eight different keys to encrypt/decrypt data, 
and encrypt/decrypt the encryption-keys itself. The encryption keys used for 
encrypting data are encrypted themselves by using two types of keys called 
ephemeral key and device transport key. Since keys are always stored on the 
device, including the master keys that encrypt other keys, the data could be 
revealed in case the device is stolen or lost. An attacker can find the master key 
stored on the device, and use it to decrypt all other keys and the data. SDSA on 
the other hand, doesn't allow storing any sensitive data on the device. Only a part 
of the API key is stored on device, which is useless to an attacker without the 
second part of the key. 
6. Difference in verifying message integrity: BES uses symmetric key 
cryptography to verify data integrity. Every device registered with BES is given a 
private key, called as message key. Only BES and the device know the value of 
this key. The mobile device uses this key to encrypt data while sending it to BES 
over network. BES recognizes the format of a decrypted and decompressed 
message. A message is automatically rejected if it is in not encrypted with keys 
that BES recognize as valid [57], A big drawback with this method is that it 
requires special keys to be stored on the mobile device and perform additional 
encryption operations in order to ensure data integrity. This introduces a 
performance overhead, and if the device is lost the encryption keys might be 
revealed. SDSA minimizes the amount of cryptographic secrets that need to be 
stored on the mobile device, and minimizes any computationally intensive tasks 
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such as encryption/decryption by moving it onto the server instead. This ensures 
that even if the device is stolen, minimal information is available for an 
unauthorized personal to access sensitive data. In order to provide message 
integrity services, SDSA use SSL protocol which doesn't requires storing any 
secrets/keys on the device. 
3.5.2 SDSA versus Apple's iCloud 
Apple's iCloud is an 'online-storage' solution that allows users to upload and store their 
personal data such as mails, photos, and music on a cloud (server) controlled by Apple. 
Users who potentially have multiple devices can benefit greatly from iCloud, as it provides 
them a central storage space. The best feature of iCloud is its capability to automatically 
synchronize data among different Apple devices owned by the user. It is still in beta testing, 
and the final release is due this year [58]. Even though iCloud allows secure access to data, 
it cannot be used in healthcare application. Following are some limitations of iCloud, and its 
differences from SDSA. 
1. iCloud does not support data sharing: iCloud provides functionality that allow 
users to download data over multiple devices owned by the user. However, the 
data cannot be shared with other users. With healthcare applications, data sharing 
ability is a key requirement. 
2. iCloud lacks device authentication: In order to access data stored on iCloud 
server, user needs to provide Apple id along with the password for 
authentication. Users could use any Apple device, and use their credentials to 
gain data-access permissions. This might be unacceptable in an organizational 
environment which requires only authorized devices to be able to access sensitive 
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data. SDSA provides a cryptographically strong device authentication technique 
to fulfill this requirement. 
3. The user authentication technique used by iCloud cannot be integrated with 
organization's current user management software such as Active Directory: 
A user must have an Apple id to be able to access data. Since only Apple knows 
user ids, they cannot be shared with the organization. This means every user must 
have separate credentials for using iCloud services, and for using other legacy 
services hosted inside an organization. SDSA makes use of user's existing 
username-password registered with any user management service, such as Active 
Directory, for user authentication. This allows SDSA to successfully integrate 
within an organization's existing IT infrastructure. 
4. iCloud is only for Apple devices: Like most commercial solutions, iCloud is 
strictly closed in terms of which devices can be used. It supports only Apple 
devices using iOS5 operating system. SDSA on the other hand, makes use of 
HL7 specification for sharing data on mobile devices with different platforms. 
5. iCloud server is controlled by Apple: A major drawback that would discourage 
many organizations from allowing its users to store sensitive data on iCloud is 
that the data is stored on a server over which the organization has no control. 
This means organizations would have to depend on Apple to provide security 
measures or any important updates that are critical to data security. There is also 
a possibility that the employees at Apple who are otherwise unauthorized to view 
data, may be able to access data and reveal its contents. With SDSA, data is 
always encrypted when on the server, and only Web API can decrypt the data 
and provide necessary data access permissions. Hence, even if organizations 
chose to host its server outside its premises, the data is assured to be protected. 
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Chapter 4 
Experimentation and Results 
In this chapter we present design and implementation of the prototype built for testing our 
secure data sharing architecture proposed in chapter three. We discuss various test cases and 
outputs of rigorous testing performed on the prototype. We also evaluate security strength of 
our solution, and analyze how it protects data against various threats. 
4.1 Introduction 
To demonstrate our security architecture proposed in chapter three, a fully functional Point-
of-Care-Testing (POCT) system was developed in collaboration with the team at Business 
Intelligence Research Group (BIRG), UNBC. POCT refers to medical testing performed at 
or near the site of patient care [59]. The motivation behind POCT is to reduce the time taken 
in conducting tests, and quickly provide healthcare providers with lab results, in order to 
assist them in making immediate decisions on patients' health. POCT includes blood 
glucose testing, hemoglobin diagnostics, cholesterol screening, and other tests which can be 
easily performed by using portable instruments that provide test results instantly. The main 
benefit of such tests is seen when the test output is immediately made available as an 
electronic record. Electronic records allow sharing results with other members of the 
medical team for their expert opinion. For this research, POCT is accomplished by using 
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mobile devices that communicate with our backend services running at the server, in order 
to collect patients' test data, or retrieve patients' existing medical information stored in 
EMR applications. We have implemented all components of SDSA, as discussed in previous 
chapter, and integrated them together to build an automated mobile lab delivery system. 
In order to determine the usability and practicality of this research, we have closely 
worked with the physicians and technical systems analysts at Northern Health Authority 
(NHA), Prince George. Northern Health is one of the largest publically-funded healthcare 
providers that cater 300,000 people over an area of 600,000 square kilometers in the 
province of British Columbia [60], With the valuable feedback from Northern Health, we 
have been able to refine our prototype such that it can be integrated with Northern Health's 
existing EMR applications and lab delivery network. This integration would allow 
physicians at NHA to use their mobile devices that are registered with NHA, to securely 
access patients' data stored in EMR applications at their clinic. Physicians would be able to 
use mobile devices while they are on field visits, to collect observations on patients' health. 
This information is saved electronically, and is transmitted to the Data Store located at the 
server for later use. 
4.2 Prototype Design 
We follow Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to design our prototype. SOA is based on 
request/reply paradigm that separates an application's business logic from the presentation 
layer, and presents it as a set of services to client applications. Service is a term that refers to 
a well-defined function that can access data, perform various operations on it, and return the 
result to the service requester. SOA consists of three components — the service provider 
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which is the backend application located at the server side, the service consumer which is 
the front end application that directly interacts with users, and the service directory which 
contains description for all the services that are offered by service provider. The main 
benefit of using SOA is its platform independent nature. SOA components are loosely 
coupled and the service interface is independent of implementation technology. This implies 
that a service-provider can be implemented by using any language or platform, and does not 
necessarily need to be the same as the one used by service-consumer. This allows 
application developers or system integrators to build applications by composing one or more 
services without knowing the services' underlying implementations [61]. 
In our prototype, the service provider constitutes the Web API that integrates with 
the Data Store, and the EMR data transfer agent. It provides the necessary services for 
authentication and secure data exchange between the devices and EMR applications. The 
service consumer includes the client application that runs on mobile devices, and the EMR 
applications. Figure 4.1 shows different components of SOA. 
75 
Service Request 
Service Provider Service Consumer 
Service Reply 
Figure 4.1 SOA Components 
When the service consumer needs to access any services or resources, request is sent to the 
service provider over the Internet. The service provider and consumer follow Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) for message exchange. SOAP is a standard lightweight protocol 
recommended by World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) for exchanging structured 
information in a distributed environment [62] [63]. It is based on XML, and is platform & 
language independent. It is especially designed for communication between applications 
over HTTP and HTTPS, which is a better way of communication since it is supported by 
most of the Internet browsers [62]. SOAP defines a specific message format in which the 
XML messages are divided into two parts - the body and the header. The message body 
contains the actual message, and the header contains application specific information such as 
authentication, and payment. Figure 4.2 shows the mapping of SDSA's components to SOA. 
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SOAP, 
SOAP 
Service Request (XML 
SQL 
Client Application 
iService Reply 
(HL7-XML) 
Service Provider EMR Applications 
Service consumer 
Figure 4.2 Mapping between SDSA and SOA 
4.3 Prototype Implementation 
As discussed in chapter three, SDSA consist of five components -Web API, Data Store, 
EMR data transfer agent, client applications, and an EMR application. The implementation 
details of all the components are described in the following sub-sections. 
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4.3.1 Web Application Programming Interface (API) 
The Web API has been built as an ASP.NET 3.5 web application to provide various data 
exchange services to client applications. It uses C# as the underlying programming 
language, and directly communicates with the Data Store and the EMR data transfer agent. 
It uses default SQL Server 2008 connection manager provided by .Net framework, in order 
to communicate with the Data Store. All the methods defined in the API have been written 
as web methods, which allow us to create a standard service directory by using Web Service 
Description Language (WSDL). WSDL is an XML based language for describing the 
definitions of web services offered by the API, and methods to access them. The service 
directory is especially useful when different implementation technologies and platforms 
need to be used among different components of SOA. Table 4.1 on the next page shows 
various services along with their descriptions that are offered by the API. 
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Service Name Description 
FetchlnboxMessagelds Fetches the list of messages currently available in the user's 
inbox. 
AcknowledgeMessageld Marks message as acknowledged. 
FetchDraftMessagelds Fetches the list of messages currently available in the user's 
draft messages folder 
FetchSentMessagelds Fetches the list of messages currently available in the user's 
sent messages folder. 
FetchMessage Fetches a specific message from the database. 
SaveMessage Saves a draft message in the DB. 
UpdateDraftMessage Update the contents of a previously saved draft message. 
SendMessage Sends a message to mirth and the storage DB. 
ForwardToEmr Forwards a message to user's EMR application. 
Authenticate Authenticates a user against the Active Directory. 
GetMessageld Queries the DB for the MSP of a user based on the username. 
AddMobileDevice Registers a mobile device's information in the DB. 
SearchForUser Searches for existing users in DB, based on MSPs, first name, 
and last name. 
GetU ser AddressBook Fetches the address book for a specific user in XML format. 
AddT oAddressBook Adds a user to the address book. 
MarkMessageDeleted Marks a message as deleted. 
UnmarkMessageDeleted Removes a delete flag from a message. 
FetchZdr Extracts the ZDR segment from the HL7 message. 
F etchProviderlnfo Extracts the provider's information from the HL7 message. 
Table 4.1 Web Services Provided by the API 
The SDSA Web API accepts SOAP based XML requests from client applications, and sends 
back the service results using the same. Any message/request that contains medical data is 
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formatted using HL7 specifications. For converting messages into HL7 specifications, the 
API uses a third party, java based open source HL7 broker called mirth-connect [64]. We 
select mirth-connect due to its widespread use in northern British Columbia, and ability to 
handle scalable message volumes at low licensing cost. Another option considered for the 
HL7 broker was Microsoft's BizTalk [65], but the proprietary nature and licensing cost 
made it unfeasible for this research. 
Following the best practices for writing secure code, we encrypt and store all the 
connection strings from the API to different components in Web.Config file [66]. This keeps 
sensitive information such as username-password for database connection confidential. We 
have parameterized all the SQL queries used by the API in order to protect our code from 
SQL injection attacks3. Furthermore, instead of simply using string variables in the API to 
temporarily store sensitive information, we make use of SecureString class provided by .Net 
library. SecureString is a special class that encrypts the text when being used, and deletes it 
from the computer memory when no longer needed [67]. This protects our code from 
memory based attacks where an invader tries to access sensitive data from the shared 
computer memory. 
4.3.2 SDSA Data Store 
The SDSA Data Store is a Microsoft SQL Server 2008 database that acts as the central 
repository for POCT data including users, address books, devices, and messages. User data 
is used to identify POCT users within the system. The Medical Service Plan (MSP) number 
is used as the main identifier. Address books contain the information which allows a user to 
3 SQL injection is a technique for exploiting any security vulnerability of an application at the database level, 
by embedding modified database queries with the user input. Vulnerabilities are present when the user input on 
the front-end is incorrectly filtered for string literal and escape characters embedded in SQL statements [73], 
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quickly find other users for the purpose of sending a message. Device information includes 
the unique device id, associated user, API key, and the salt-value. Messages are stored in 
XML format identified by the message ID with a separate lookup table associating users to 
messages. This database is encrypted by using AES-256-bit encryption, and accessed only 
via the API to provide proper security. Standard Windows-based authentication and access 
procedures for SQL Server 2008 are used for accessing the database. Figure 4.3 shows 
the database schema. 
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Figure 4.3 SDSA Data Store Schema 
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4.3.3 EMR Data Transfer Agent 
The EMR data transfer Agent is installed on the machine that hosts EMR application. The 
agent periodically triggers a sequence of actions that allow it to download new messages 
from the EMR application and submit them to the API. It connects to the API and requests 
the timestamp of the last message submitted, and then uses it to get a list of message 
IDs from the API. These IDs are used to filter out duplicate messages. The EMR Data 
Transfer Agent queries the EMR database for the IDs of all messages with data and time 
greater than the timestamp received from the API. The message IDs are then checked 
against the list obtained from the EMR Data Transfer Agent and any duplicates are removed. 
The agent then iterates through the remaining message IDs and queries the database for all 
required fields for the HL7 message. These fields are assembled into an XML formatted 
HL7 message and transmitted over an authenticated HTTPS channel to the API Web 
Service. 
4.3.4 Client Application 
We have implemented an iOS based client application that can be installed on any Apple 
mobile device including iPad, iPhone, and iPod touch that runs on iOS 4.0 or above. The 
application is written in Objective-C4. It is built upon Model-View-Controller (MVC) design 
paradigm where the Model contains classes that encapsulate application data, View is made 
up of the windows, controls, and other elements that user can see and interacts with, 
and Controller mediates the logic between Model and View. The separation of 
responsibilities in MVC simplifies the design and maintenance of an application by 
allowing changes to different components independently. Figure 4.4 shows the MVC 
design paradigm. 
4 Objective-C is the native language supported by Apple devices. 
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Database / Other 
Storage 
Mechanism 
Figure 4.4 Model View Controller Design 
Objective-C allows manual de-allocation and dereferencing of objects created throughout 
the application. This is better than automatic garbage collection especially when using 
devices with limited memory resources. Since automatic garbage collection can sometimes 
delay releasing resources, it is difficult to estimate and manage the actual size of the 
working set in memory. The delay also interferes with releasing other resources, such as 
descriptors and view handlers, which causes resource starvation. Garbage collection 
demands CPU time for memory management, but, with manual memory management this 
time can be saved. In order to ensure data confidentiality on the device, we restrict our 
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application to release all objects and dereference them to 'nil', as soon as our application is 
interrupted by another process running on the device, such as a phone call or receiving a text 
message. This protects data that is temporarily stored and being reviewed on device, from 
any malicious processes that could possibly manipulate device's shared memory to access 
the data. With manual memory management it is possible to restrict any unauthorized 
process or method call running on the device to access data. The user must establish a new 
session with the server every time an application is interrupted or intentionally closed. The 
only limitation with this is the inconvenience of re-establishing the session. Although, this 
could be improved if credentials can temporarily be cached on the device, as this would not 
require users to re-enter their credentials every time. Temporarily caching credentials 
presents many security risks and the solution to protect credentials would be different for 
different mobile platforms. A possible solution to this could be using hardware encryption, if 
supported by the mobile device, to encrypt the credentials while they are cached in the 
memory. However, securing the cache memory of the device is out of scope of our research 
work. 
Since iOS Software Development Kit (SDK) does not include constructs to consume 
SOAP based web service, we use a third party open source tool, called SudzC [68], to 
generate the corresponding objective-C code. SudzC reads the application's service 
directory created in WSDL, and generates the corresponding source code that allows 
communication between the client application and the Web API. Current functionality of the 
application includes: 
• Device and User Authentication: When the application launches on the device, users 
are prompted to enter their credentials (username-password and a four digit key). 
Every device securely stores a partial API key that was provided during device 
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registration. We use Apple's keychain5 to store the key. On every data access 
request, user's credentials and the device's API key are sent to the Web API for 
authentication. The data access permission is given to the user on successful 
verification of user's credentials. 
• Send Messages: Users can compose and send messages related to a patient's health. 
For example, a physician can send a message indicating lab results of a patient 
to another physician. The messages must include all the required fields of the CIX 
specification. 
• View Messages: After successful authentication, the application downloads a list of 
sent/received/draft messages from the API and displays this list to the user; allowing 
them to view the content of each individual message. Users can also subscribe to 
receive a copy of messages that are stored in their EMR. 
• Save/Compose Drafts: While composing a new message user can save the 
incomplete message as draft. This allows message composition to be resumed later. 
Using this feature, users can quickly take notes on patient's health during a home 
visit and complete the full message at a later time. 
• Forward to EMR: A message composed on an iOS device can be forwarded to 
physicians' EMR to allow continued authoring of the message at a later date. This 
feature is dependent on support provided by the EMR application, and may not be 
compatible with all applications. 
4.3.5 EMR Application 
We use Medical Office Information System (MOIS) as EMR application due to its 
popularity and widespread use within northern British Columbia. MOIS is capable of 
integrating with lab delivery networks within healthcare organization, and receive lab results 
from various facilities inside the organization. It is primarily used by physicians for medical 
5 Keychain is a secure, encrypted container provided by Apple to store sensitive data such, as username-
passwords, on the device. The keychain data for an application is stored outside the application's sandbox and 
is controlled directly by iOS. Only authenticated application processes are allowed to access application data 
stored in keychain [74], 
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office billing, scheduling, and documenting key elements of patient medical records 
including encounter notes, past procedures, prescriptions, allergies, consultation and referral 
reports [69]. We assume that all lab reports are delivered to MOIS, and it acts as data source 
for our prototype. The amount of patients' previous health information, such as previous lab 
reports, is limited by the amount of information stored in MOIS. Although, new data 
collected by using our client applications is independent of MOIS. 
4.3.6 Error Handling and Logging 
The implementation provides several levels of error handling and logging, offered at the 
Web API, the Data Store, and the client application. The Web API is written to catch any 
errors and exceptions in performing API service calls. Whenever an exception is raised, the 
API returns useful error messages indicating the reason for failure. The client application 
can use these error messages to debug the problem. Figure 4.5 shows the client application 
displaying an error message received from the API. The client application logs various 
actions performed by the application by using NSLog and NSAssert classes available in 
Objective-C. We also store a log of all the activities performed on the data-store by using 
SQL-Server's logging system. This information is particularly useful while debugging 
errors, and when administrator needs to trace and analyze various activities on the database. 
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Figure 4.5 Error Message Received From the API 
4.4 Experimentation Requirements 
By simulating a mobile POCT system we have been able to perform series of experiments at 
BIRG research lab to determine the feasibility of our proposed architecture. Through these 
experiments we analyze the usability, deployment cost, security, and scalability of the 
prototype. We use standardized performance monitoring tools and applications, such as 
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Apple's Xcode performance instruments, to collect and store our test results. To obtain 
accurate results, the performance testing is done on the mobile devices, and on the server. 
We define usage scenarios for our prototype in section 4.4.1. The specific criteria that are 
used for evaluating the prototype are defined in section 4.5. We have divided the evaluation 
criteria into two broad categories - usability and technical. Usability criteria include 
requirements that should be fulfilled from user's perspective such as assessing user 
friendliness, platform independency, and ease of software installation. The technical criteria 
focus on requirements such as memory and CPU resources consumed by the application to 
perform various operations. 
4.4.1 Usage Scenario 
There are two main scenarios where our prototype can be used. 
1. Using POCT system inside a clinic or hospital: Our solution can be used by 
healthcare providers, inside their clinics or hospitals. In this case, the POCT client 
application, installed on their registered mobile devices, is used to note observations 
on a patient's health, and to compose new EMRs. These EMRs can be forwarded to 
physician's EMR desktop application that directly connects with existing lab 
delivery networks inside a clinic or a hospital. The client application allows 
physicians to create quick drafts on the mobile device and store it in POCT Data 
Store. These drafts can be resumed later and can be forwarded to EMR application 
on completion. Using our system, physicians can also request to download lab results 
of a patient from the EMR application. These results, by default, are forwarded by 
various facilities within the hospital to the EMR desktop application. The user 
establishes a secure session with the Web API, which extracts the lab results from 
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EMR application and makes it available on mobile devices. Our client application 
has the capability to embed various templates that can be used to collect medical data 
of different types. Such templates include blood-glucose tests, clinical summaries, 
referrals, prescriptions, and general observations. 
2. Using POCT system during a field visit: In this scenario, we assume the user is 
travelling and cannot access the local-network that is available from within the 
organization. An organization usually implements security mechanisms, such as 
authentication with Active Directory, to protect its services from unauthorized 
access. However, additional security measures must be applied when accessing these 
services from outside the local-network. Our prototype allows users to use all the 
services, as described in the first scenario, while roaming. By using special device 
and user authentication mechanisms, the access of services while roaming can be 
considered strongly authenticated. In order to access the services, the mobile traveler 
establishes a secure session with the Web API by using HTTPS connection over the 
Internet. 
4.5 Validation against Criteria 
4.5.1 Usability Criteria 
Criterion 1: The solution should be easy to use. 
The User Interface (UI) of client application needs to be simple and intuitive. Since mobile 
devices have limited screen size, the UI should not be congested for users to input patient 
data. It is important that the text is clearly displayed and has a readable font size. The client 
application should be responsive and should be free from delays in view transformations. 
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The application should also be easy to install for users and administrators. This criterion 
also contributes to commercial viability of the solution. 
Validation: Our client application has a very simple navigation-based, default iOS 
application design. The application is carefully designed to be similar to iOS default mail 
application, so that it looks familiar to users. The application consists of clear text menus 
that are intuitive and easy to read. It requires no additional software to be installed on the 
mobile device, than the application itself, in order to connect with rest of our system. The 
application displays error messages by using pop-up notifications, in case of any exceptions 
related to either data entry or any other failure during message transmission. Figure 4.6.1 
and 4.6.2 shows screenshots of the client application. 
Since the Web API runs as a background web service on the server side, minimal 
interaction is needed by the administrator. For device registration, a C# console application 
has been built, that allows administrators to generate a cryptographically random device-API 
key. The administrator enters the information about mobile device and the end user by using 
command line input. All other components of SDSA run as background services which are 
configured to automatically start on system boot. Everything on the server side, except for 
device registration, is automated and requires minimal user-interaction. Hence, we consider 
criterion 1 to be fulfilled. 
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New Message 
To Anthony McCann, Ashish Sachdeva 
Patient Identification 
Sending Facility 
Report Data 
Blood Sugar: Normal 
Temperature: 99f 
Allergies: none 
Additional Notes 
Viral infection. 
O 
Mallet Amanda 
r'l C-: : X -Sii'': X 
Patient Type 
PRE OUT ER 
Report Type 
MICROBIOLOGY BLOOD BANK 
Observation Date & Time 
Date 21 08 2011 Time 12 20 
Figure 4.6.1 iOS Client Application Screenshot - Compose Message. 
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TEST. TROY - MB - 7/25/2011 11:46:51 AM 
Mills MH 
TEST, TROY 
Sex: 
Admit Date: 
Healthcare#: 
Ordering: 
Copies To: 
Age: 
NH#: 
DOB: 
5T, TROY 11-0785-
44 
ROUTINE CULTURES 
PDT 
PDT 
PROCEDURE: Wound Culture 
SOURCE: Wound 
BODY SITE: Arm 
COLLECTED: 09/16/2010 09:44 
STARTED: 09/16/2010 14:57 
ACCESSION: 24-10-259-8002 
STAINS / PREPARATIONS 
Gram Stain Report 
Verified:09/L6/2010 14:57 PDT 
No organisms .seen. 
FINAL REPORT 
Final Report 
verified:09/16/2010 14:59 PDT 
No growth at 24 hours. 
No arowth at 48 hours. 
Coimr.ents: 
£ Mi IliiM & 
Figure 4.6.2 iOS Client Application Screenshot - View Message. 
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Criterion 2: The solution should be platform independent. 
The solution should not be limited to a particular platform or a set of platforms. 
Validation: We use ASP.Net framework to build the web service API. The functionality of 
web service is platform independent, and would remain the same even if it is written using 
any other programming language. We restrict the web service to accept XML formatted 
strings as input, and for sending results. This allows smooth integration with mobile devices 
of different platforms, as long as client applications can parse XML formatted strings. XML 
itself is a platform independent standard for data exchange. We use WSDL to create the 
service directory which is accessed by client applications written in different programming 
languages. Our Web services are currently hosted on the server using Internet Information 
Services (IIS) 7.0. However, the services are compatible with many other web servers as 
well. Hence, we consider criterion 2 to be fulfilled. 
4.5.2 Technical Criteria 
Criterion 3: The underlying cryptography algorithms must be NIST certified. 
It is important to select strong cryptography algorithms for encryption and hashing 
purposes. These algorithms are the core of any security solution. The level of security 
provided by any solution directly relies upon the security strength of these algorithms. It is 
also important to use only those algorithms which are popular and are widely used in 
industry, to ensure maximum compatibility between different components of our 
architecture. 
Validation: All cryptography algorithms used in our solution have been recognized as 
standard algorithms by NIST. We use HMAC-SHA1-256 algorithm as our hashing 
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algorithm, and AES-256 as encryption algorithm. These are cryptographically strong 
algorithms that are broadly used in industries dealing with highly sensitive data. Hence, 
criterion 3 should be considered fulfilled. 
Criterion 4: The keys should be generated using a secure random number generator 
and must be of standard length as recommended by NIST. 
All security keys must be generated in a secure way by an authorized entity only. The keys 
should be unique and random for every mobile device. It is important that a strong 
cryptography algorithm is used to generate random numbers, otherwise the security 
strength of the key is considered weak. 
Validation: All keys used in SDSA are generated by using a specially designed C# console 
application. The application uses RNGCryptoServiceProvider class [70] provided by .Net 
cryptography library to generate random numbers. This is considered a standard technique to 
implement secure random number generator. As recommended by NIST, we use 256-bit key 
length for our hashing algorithm, and the same for encryption algorithm. Hence, criterion 4 
should be considered fulfilled. 
Criterion 5: The private keys should be securely stored on the device and server. 
If the private keys are compromised it defeats the whole purpose of performing 
authentication of mobile user. It is important that these keys are stored securely and can 
only be accessed by authorized users/entities. 
Validation: Storing keys on the device can cause critical security breach in any solution. If 
the keys are revealed, the data can be considered compromised. SDSA is designed to 
minimize the number of keys that need to be stored on the mobile device. Since, most of the 
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cryptography operations are moved to the server side, mobile devices store just a single API 
key used for device authentication. To protect the key while it is stored on the device, we 
divide it into two parts, and store only one of the parts on the device. Hence, even if the 
partial key stored on the device is compromised, it is useless without the other part that is 
known only to the authorized owner of the device. To further protect the key, we store the 
partial key in a secure storage space provided by mobile devices, such as Apple's Keychain. 
It is assumed that every mobile device that is supported by SDSA would already have a 
default built-in secure storage space that can only be accessed by authorized application and 
processes. 
In SDSA, the server stores just a single key for encrypting/decrypting data in the 
data-store. This key is encrypted and stored in web.config file of the Web API. When a new 
device API key is generated for any new device, the server uses HMAC-SHA1-256 
algorithm to calculate a hash on the key. The server stores this hash value for device 
authentication, and discards the original key after it is distributed to the user. Since hashing 
function is irreversible in nature, even if the hash value is revealed corresponding key cannot 
be recomputed. Thus, we consider SDSA secures keys while on the device or at the server. 
Hence, we consider criterion 5 to be fulfilled. 
Criterion 6: In case of loss or theft of mobile device, data must remain protected from 
unauthorized access and must be able to recover on a new device. 
If a mobile device is lost or stolen, the patient data must remain secure. Under no 
circumstances an unauthorized user should be able to access patient data, or reveal any 
other sensitive information (such as private keys) that would cause a security breach. It is 
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important that if a mobile device is damaged or lost, user should be allowed to restore all 
the data and application settings on the new device. 
Validation: Unlike other data sharing solutions, SDSA enforces that data should be 
consolidated into a single repository stored at the server side. Data of every user is stored on 
the server, and not on the mobile device. Hence, even if the user loses the device, all the data 
can be restored on a new device. The user must request the administrator to register the new 
device with the Web API, by generating a new device API key and discarding the old one. 
Since, the old key is discarded the lost mobile device is deauthorized and cannot be used to 
access data anymore. Hence, we consider criterion 6 to be fulfilled. 
Criterion 7: The sensitive data should remain protected and secure from employees at 
mobile telecommunication provider. 
When data is exchanged between the mobile device and the web API, it must be protected 
from employees at the telecommunication providers. This is an important requirement, as 
the telecommunication providers can sometimes route data packets to locations which are 
outside the home country of the hospital. This can raise many privacy concerns, and would 
discourage organizations dealing with confidential data from using such solutions. 
Validation: Some data exchange solutions, such as BES, requires data to be forwarded to a 
third party Network Operation Center (NOC). The data packets, exchanged between the 
server and the mobile device, remain at NOC until the recipient is ready to receive data. This 
introduces a critical security risk. SDSA does not forwards data packets to NOC. It instead 
establishes a direct SSL connection between the server and the mobile device, and performs 
mutual authentication. The data is divided into small packets which are encrypted 
individually. The data is sent over the network by using a reliable transport layer protocol, 
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such as TCP/IP. This ensures that the data remains protected during transmission and would 
be delivered to correct recipient only. We consider criterion 7 to be fulfilled. 
Criterion 8: Data should be protected while it is stored at the server. 
Organizations usually host servers in a virtualized environment, with same server providing 
different type of services to different user groups. This helps in optimizing system resources 
of the server, and conserves resource requirements of an organization. The Data stored at 
the server must remain secure from any personnel who is not authorized to access patients' 
data, but still has authorization to access other services hosted by the server. 
Validation: The data stored in Data Store is always encrypted and cannot be accessed by 
any component of SDSA other than the Web API. Only API has access to the decryption 
key. In addition to storing data as encrypted, the data-store requires user authentication to 
provide access to administrators. The user authentication is linked with Active Directory, 
which categorizes users in different groups based on their credentials. In our implementation 
of SDSA, we have configured the Data Store, a SQL Server 2008 relational database, to be 
visible only to users who are classified under administrator user-group. The data inside 
remains encrypted to ensure data confidentiality. Hence, we consider criterion 8 to be 
fulfilled. 
Criterion 9: Data must be protected while being viewed on the mobile device. 
When the user establishes a session with the web API for accessing data, it is important that 
data remains secure throughout the session. Once the session is terminated, no trace of data 
should be available on the mobile devices. This is an important requirement to protect data 
from any malicious code attempting to access sensitive data. 
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Validation: When user establishes a session with the Web API, in order to access the data, 
data-access permission is granted by the server for a fixed time-interval (e.g. five minutes). 
The user must re-establish the session after the fixed time interval. If there is no activity 
from the user for about five minutes, our client application automatically terminates the 
session and locks out the user. The user must provide all the credentials again to reestablish 
the session. If the user continues to use the application beyond the fixed time interval, then 
instead of locking out the user, the application automatically extends the current time limit. 
When an application is closed by the user, or minimized, or interrupted by another 
application, all the objects created by the application are dereferenced and released. Once 
the application is closed, no data trace is available. Hence, we consider criterion 9 as 
fulfilled. 
Criterion 10: Data read/write operations must be performed within an acceptable 
amount of time. 
This is one of the most important criterions that evaluate the overall performance of any 
security solution. It is important that users are able to access data within a reasonable 
amount of time; otherwise it might discourage them from using the solution. 
Validation: The time taken to perform read/write operation includes the time spent in 
performing user/device authentication, time taken to transmit data over the network, and 
time taken by the server to format the message with HL7 specifications. In order to monitor 
the performance of our system, we ran series of tests on a first generation iPad. We created 
various tests cases using different parameters, such as number of messages sent/received, 
message size, and connection type. The data was recorded by using Apple's Xcode 
performance instruments. The results of each test case are discussed as follows: 
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Read/Write performance by network connection 
We have designed two test cases for recording the read/write time based on type of network 
connection. In first case, we run the tests using a high speed Wi-Fi network with various 
batches of messages. This case simulates the usage scenario where the user accesses data 
from within an organization. In second case we simulate mobile traveller by using a 3G 
network connection to send and receive messages. Four different batch sizes, ranging from 
10 to 500 messages per batch were used for testing. The sample message contains textual 
information, and is 4KB in size. We record time taken to read and write individual 
messages, and calculate the average time taken by each batch. We also record the maximum 
and minimum time for each batch to represent the best case and worst case scenario. 
UNBC's Wi-Fi network and 3G connection by Bell, Canada was used to run the tests. Table 
4.2 shows the network speed that was available for running the tests. Figure 4.7 and Figure 
4.8 shows different graphs representing the results of our tests. 
Connection Type Downstream Upstream Latency 
Wi-Fi 4.95 Mbps .733 Mbps 45ms 
3G 0.92 Mbps 0.33 Mbps 324ms 
Table 4.2 Network Connection Speed 
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From the graphs shown in figure 4.10 and 4.11, we find that the average time taken to read 
or write messages significantly varies between 3G and Wi-Fi network. On an average, write 
time over Wi-Fi is 23ms (4.03 %) less than 3G. The read time is 383.5ms (89.97%) less than 
3G. The improvement in message read/write time when using Wi-Fi is due to its faster 
downstream/upstream speed and low network latency of only 45ms. Network latency is 
dependent on many factors such as propagation delay, router delays, computer hardware 
delays, and interference due to weather and electromagnetic signals. It is one of the key 
factors that affects the network performance, and therefore affects the read and write times. 
Unfortunately, we cannot control high latency involved with the 3G networks. Eliminating 
network latency is a broad problem, and is out of scope of this work. 
In our testing, we observed that while reading/writing messages in batch mode, there 
were few random peaks in read/write times caused due to network latency as well as the 
application latency. Application latency involves the delay in manipulating and presenting 
data, caused due to intense disk input/output operations and hardware limitations such as 
amount of main memory. This causes the average maximum time to be exceptionally large. 
Although, the average time taken for sending/receiving messages always remains close to 
the minimum range. This implies that most samples are unaffected by random latency peaks. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the average data read/write times. 
3G Wi-Fi 
Read Write Read Write 
Average Time [ms] 426.25 570.25 42.75 547.25 
Average Min Time [ms] 388.00 516.75 34.25 492.25 
Average Max Time [ms] 709.95 876.00 75.25 759.25 
Table 4.3 Message Read/Write Times 
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Read/Write performance by message size 
In order to evaluate the effect of message size on the performance, we calculate the average 
time taken by the iPad to send and receive sample messages of varying sizes. We ran five 
test cases that use different sample messages of size 4KB, 8KB, 10KB, 50KB, and 100KB. 
Each test case was run in a loop of hundred, and the average time taken to read and write a 
message was recorded. Figure 4.9 shows the results of our tests. 
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Figure 4.9 Read/Write Time versus Message Size 
Comparison with other data sharing solutions 
Due to unavailability of performance results of other data sharing solutions, we are limited 
to compare our test results with Secure Sharing Scheme (SSS) only. Furthermore, SSS is the 
Size in Kbytes 
103 
only mobile data security solution that is designed specifically for data sharing among group 
members. In order to perform fair comparison, we use Wi-Fi network connection with 
2.4Mbps downlink and 153Kbps uplink speed to meet the specifications as published in 
[20]. Since SDSA performs most cryptography operations on the server instead of the 
device, it significantly outperforms SSS both in terms of time required to read and write 
data. Table 4.4 summarizes the comparison. We consider criterion 10 to be fulfilled. 
SDSA SSS 
10KB 50KB 100KB 10KB 50KB 100KB 
Write 1 3.77 5.45 4.18 11.9 21.5 
Read .05 .09 .15 2.99 3.30 4.91 
Table 4 .4 SDSA versus SSS 
Criterion 11: On-device resource consumption must be optimized. 
Most security solutions are highly resource intensive. Due to limited resources available on 
mobile devices, it is important that the security solution must optimize resource utilization. 
Validation: To determine the on-device resources used while using our application, we 
record CPU and memory usage on the mobile device using Xcode performance monitoring 
instruments. Figure 4.10 shows a snapshot of device's CPU activity, while the client 
application is being used. Our application only takes 13 MB of disk space on the device. 
Since most of the cryptographic operations are performed at the server, the only overhead 
involved at the client application is for establishing the SSL connection and 
sending/receiving SOAP requests. The CPU usage is 0-25% while browsing contents of the 
application. The application takes about 36.53 MB of physical memory. We consider our 
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application to be a low resource consuming application, and consider criterion 11 to be 
fulfilled. 
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Figure 4.10 CPU Performance Monitor 
Criterion 12: Solution must support both Wi-Fi and 3G network connections. 
Mobile devices not always support Wi-Fi or 3G network connectivity. It is important that the 
solution must be able to provide its services over Internet regardless of the type of network 
connection used. This would allow using the solution while the user is travelling and does 
not have any Wi-Fi connectivity. 
Validation: Our solution is compatible with both Wi-Fi and 3G network connection. We 
have tested our application with both connection types, as discussed in validation for 
criterion 10. Hence, we consider criterion 12 to be fulfilled. 
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Criterion 13: The solution must be scalable. 
The solution must be scalable to accommodate growing number of users and mobile devices 
used by them. Users must be allowed to register more than one mobile device to be able to 
access the services provided by our POCT system. 
Validation: SDSA allows multiple users to register for the services provided by the Web 
API. Users are allowed to register multiple devices without any restrictions. The Web API is 
hosted on a virtual machine running Windows Server 2008 platform. The virtual machine 
utilizes single core processor with speed up to 3.2 Ghz, and 4 gigabytes of memory. We use 
IIS 7.0 webserver to host our web services. In order to load test the functional behaviour and 
measure performance of our webserver, we use soapUI performance monitor [71]. Using the 
performance monitor we collect the average time taken to read/write a 4KB message, when 
multiple users request data-access concurrently. We created test cases with different number 
of users - 10, 50, 100, 250, 500, 750, and 1000. Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 shows the 
results. 
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Figure 4.11 SDSA Web Server Performance Test Results - Read Data 
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Figure 4.12 SDSA Web Server Performance Test Results - Write Data 
We found that the read time remains unaffected when 100 users request data access 
concurrently. The message read time increases by 55.2% when number of users grows to 
250. The time continuously increases as the number of users grow beyond 500. Even with 
1000 users concurrently requesting read data access, the time taken to read a message is just 
1.42 seconds. We observe that similar to read performance, the write time performance 
degrades linearly with growing number of users. Although, the performance degradation 
with write data operation is much higher than the read operation, due to the nature of write 
operations and limitations of underlying hardware of the server. Since we are using only 
single core CPU, the growing number of concurrent write operations, that involves intensive 
disk I/O and SQL data-integrity checks, increases the CPU load up to 100%. This causes 
significant increase in the average time taken to perform write data operation. However, 
even under high load our server can handle over few thousand messages in an hour. The 
solution can easily be scaled up by using more powerful server machine, or hosting the Web 
API on more than one servers and load balancing the requests. Table 4.5 shows the test 
results. We assume criterion 13 to be fulfilled. 
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No. of users 10 50 100 250 500 750 1000 
Read Time [ms] 14.87 32.34 39.8 88.9 367 885 1424 
Write Time [ms] 384.5 3762.64 6789 12480.37 32382.41 42769.69 50923.14 
Table 4.5 SDSA Web Server Performance Test Results 
4.6 Summary of Validation against Criteria 
Criterion Description Fulfilled 
1 Easy to use solution Yes 
2 Platform independent solution Yes 
3 
Using Standard cryptographic 
algorithms 
Yes 
4 
Secure generation of public-private 
keys 
Yes 
5 
Secure storage of private keys on server 
and the device 
Yes 
6 Data recovery in case of device theft Yes 
7 
Securing data from employees at 
telecommunication provider 
Yes 
8 Securing data while it is at the server Yes 
9 
Securing data while it is being viewed 
on the mobile device 
Yes 
10 Low data read/write time Yes 
11 Low on-device resource consumption Yes 
12 Support for Wi-Fi and 3G Yes 
13 Scalability of the solution Yes 
Table 4.6 Summary of Validation against Criteria 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
Using mobile devices for healthcare is an emerging field that can significantly improve the 
way in which EMRs are currently stored and accessed. It increases the availability of 
patients' medical data especially during field visits and POCT scenarios, which assists 
healthcare providers in making better decisions regarding patients' health, therefore 
enhancing the quality of patient-care. However, there are number of challenges in 
implementing mobile data sharing solutions before adoption by healthcare systems (see 
chapter 1). 
Mobile data sharing solutions proposed in various research papers, as discussed in 
chapter 2, fail to fulfill security requirements, and do not use mandatory standards for 
exchanging medical data. Most solutions assume encrypted data on the mobile device is 
protected. However, encryption just provides data-confidentiality, and does not provide data 
privacy. Another critical problem with these solutions is the way in which cryptography 
keys are managed. The keys are either stored on the mobile device or an additional hardware 
such as another mobile device, portable flash memory, and a key fob, is used to store the 
keys. Storing keys on the device introduces the risk of keys being stolen. Using additional 
hardware to provide keys can be a costly solution, especially when deployed for 
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organizations with large number of users. It also involves additional responsibility of 
securing the hardware from theft or loss. 
Our proposed model has identified various vulnerable locations in mobile data-
communication infrastructure that could possibly cause security breaches and compromise 
sensitive data. We have designed a low cost secure data sharing architecture called SDSA 
that addresses the aforementioned challenges. SDSA provides end-to-end data security 
during transmission, on the device, and the server. It consolidates data into a central 
repository located at server side behind a secure firewall, and uses standard security 
mechanisms such as authentication and encryption to provide data confidentiality and 
privacy. SDSA only allows registered devices to be used for accessing data. It performs 
two-step authentication that verifies the user and the device identity. By using simple 
username-password based authentication, SDSA allows integration with user management 
applications such as Active Directory. This allows organizations to categorize users in 
different groups and effectively control data access permissions for individual groups. 
SDSA divides the device's API key (used for device authentication) into two parts. The 
mobile device stores only one of the two parts, and therefore the API key remains secure in 
case of loss or theft. 
Use of open standards such as XML, HTTPS, and SOAP ensure interoperability 
between different components, and allow integration with EMR applications. Various 
usability and technical criteria were designed to evaluate the security and feasibility of this 
work. A prototype application customized for the POCT scenario was built, and 
demonstrated that our solution meet all the requirements. Our solution outperforms data 
sharing solution proposed in [20] in terms of required computation resources and time taken 
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to read/write data. In addition to general data sharing, our solution has the ability to connect 
with EMR applications and retrieve patients' lab results collected from various facilities. 
5.1 Limitation(s) of Proposed Work 
1. SDSA allows users to securely access data by establishing a session with the remote 
server. Data access in connected mode enables organizations to keep complete 
control of the data usage and ensure that it is being accessed by authorized users. 
However, this makes data access limited to network availability, and data cannot be 
accessed in disconnected mode. In order to mitigate the downtime, SDSA supports 
both Wi-Fi and 3G network connectivity, which increases network availability. 
2. HL7 specifications require all the mandatory data fields to be filled before data can 
be exchanged. This introduces an overhead in terms of message size. With our 
current implementation, the minimum message size would always be 4KB. Since we 
have implemented only few HL7 data fields, our prototype currently limits the 
usability to currently available fields. This limitation can be easily eliminated by 
including more number of data fields, as needed. 
5.2 Future Work 
A desirable feature in any data sharing solution is the ability to operate in disconnected 
mode. The increase in availability of Wi-Fi and 3G technologies have made it possible to get 
Internet connectivity almost everywhere, especially in developed countries. However, 
during field visits, healthcare providers may need to access data in rural areas with no 
network connectivity. A possible solution to this could be allowing user to temporarily 
download part of the data, while the network connectivity is available, and access it in 
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disconnected mode later. However, it would be impossible for organizations to control user 
authentication and track data access in disconnected mode. We would further research and 
discover possibilities of an effective offline authentication mechanism that would ensure 
data privacy. 
We would like to extend our prototype to support connectivity with portable medical 
devices such as glucometer, and blood pressure monitors. This would benefit healthcare 
providers by enabling them to use mobile devices for conducting tests in real time, and 
directly storing the results as EMRs. Integration with medical devices involves compatibility 
and security issues. Few medical devices are currently available that support mobile 
connectivity. These devices use proprietary software applications and do not allow 
integration with other data sharing solutions. 
In addition to the iOS client application, we have deployed our data sharing solution 
on an Android based Samsung Galaxy Tablet 10.1, by using Adobe's Flex framework [72]. 
Flex allows building mobile applications for iOS, Android, and Blackberry platform, by 
using single source code. We would conduct performance testing on Flex mobile 
applications, and compare it with native client applications. We would also like to deploy 
our prototype in an actual hospital/clinic, and further understand specific requirements to 
enhance the usability of our solution. 
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Appendix 1 
XML Message Format using HL7 version 2.3.1 
<?xml version-'1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<message> 
<MSH> 
<sendingApplication></sendingApplication> 
<sendingFacility></sendingFacility> 
<messageDateT ime></messageDateT ime> 
<messageT ype></messageT ype> 
<messageControlID></messageControlID> 
<processingID></processingID> 
<versionID></versionID> 
</MSH> 
<PID> 
<internalPatientID></internalPatientID> 
<patientN ame></patientN ame> 
</PID> 
<PV1> 
<patientClass></patientClass> 
</PVl> 
<NTE> 
<comments></comments> 
</NTE> 
<ORC> 
<orderControl></orderControl> 
</ORC> 
<OBR> 
<setID></setID> 
<placerOrderNumber></placerOrderNumber> 
<fillerOrderNumber></fillerOrderNumber> 
<universalServiceID></universalServiceID> 
<observationDate></observationDate> 
</OBR> 
<!-- multiple OBX segments are permitted. We only support the 'TX' type —> 
<OBX> 
<setld></setld> 
<Typex/Type> 
<observati onx/ob servation> 
</OBX> 
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<ZDR> 
<provider> 
<providerMnemonic></providerMnemonic> 
<lastName></lastName> 
<firstN ame></firstN ame> 
<middleName></middleName> 
<suffix></suffix> 
<title></title> 
<degree></degree> 
<providerCategoryCode></providerCategoryCode> 
</provider> 
</ZDR> 
</message> 
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iOS Client Application Screenshots 
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mm mm 
New Message 
To: Anthony McCann 
Patient Identification 
Q 
Chen Paul 
pf 'Of :X S  u  M i x  
r> 
Sending Facility 
George 
Patient Type 
PRE OUT 
. J  .  
Report Type 
MICROBIOLOGY 
ER 
BLOOD BANK 
Observation Date & Time 
Date i 21 2011 Time 12 ] ! 20 
Report Data 
Blood Sugar : Normal 
Temperature: 99F 
Additional Notes 
Forward to EMR 
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TEST, TROY - MB - 7/25/2011 11:46:51 AM 
mm m 
Milts MH 
TEST, TROY 
Sex: 
Admit Date: 
Healthcare#: 
Ordering: 
Copies To: 
Age: 
NH#: 
DOB: 
TEST, TF.GY 
44 
11-073E 
ROUTINE CULTURES 
PDT 
PDT 
3TAINS 
PROCEDURE: Wound Culture 
SOURCE: wound 
BODY SITE: Arm 
PREPARATIONS 
COLLECTED: 09/1C/2010 09:44 
STARTED: 09/16/2010 14:57 
ACCESSION: 2 4-10-259-8002 
Gram Stain Report 
Verified:09/16/2010 14:57 PDT 
No organisms seen. 
FINAL REPORT 
Final Report 
verified:09/I 6/2010 14:59 PDT 
No growth at: 24 hours. 
No growth at 4 8 hours. 
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